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Abstract

Cyber operations are the most important aspect of military conflicts in the 21st century,
but unfortunately they are also among the least understood. They encompasses a wide range
of situations up to and including the complicated endeavor of computer network defense.
The continual battle for network dominance between attackers and defenders is considered
to be a complex game. This viewpoint has led to the rise of game theory principles being
applied to cyber warfare scenarios. Game theory, with its ability to provide a mathematical
analysis of game models, is a device that helps to increase defensive capabilities.
Hypergame theory is an extension of game theory that addresses the kind of games
where misperception exists, as is often the case in military engagements. Hypergame
theory, like game theory, uses a game model to determine strategy selection, but goes
beyond game theory by examining subgames that exist within the full game. Analysis of
hypergames offers advantageous reasoning for strategy selection during conflicts through
robust situational awareness. The inclusion of misperception and misinformation in the
hypergame model shows the usefulness of the theory because it provides strategy selection
techniques that are designed to mitigate risks.
This goal of this research is to provide a foundation for the use of hypergame theory
for adaptable cyber defense systems able to adjust to the existence of misperceptions
and misinformation. A general hypergame model, created around a cyber attack and
defense scenario, influences the design of an innovative software tool for hypergame
analysis. Extensive testing validates that the custom software achieves hypergame model
requirements. The game-based software simulation is achieved by running iterations of
game play where adaptability of strategy selection is the key focus. The results discovered
in this research effort are an indication that there is utility in applying hypergame theory
to the study of network defense techniques. This innovative research indicates that the
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application of hypergame theory is able to achieve the adaptive nature required for today’s
and tomorrow’s cyber defense needs.
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APPLIED HYPERGAME THEORY FOR NETWORK DEFENSE

I.

Introduction

yber operations are the most important aspect of military conflicts in the 21st century,

C

but unfortunately they are also among the least understood. The term “cyber

operations” is not even fully defined and can encompass a wide range of situations and
targets [32]. Even given this fact, cyber warfare at the very least covers the area of computer
network defense. Defense of networks is a complicated endeavor, which is a reason why
many ways of accomplishing this task have been explored. Game theory, with its ability to
provide a mathematical analysis of conflict, is being explored as an option that increases
defense capabilities. “Security at network layer imposes future challenges for us to address
security at a larger and more complex scale and game theory provides a preliminary tool
that enables a quantitative study of such complex systems” [33]. The fusion of game
theoretic techniques and network defense systems is destined to become the backbone of
any robust cyber defense technique.
1.1

State of Cyber Defense
The rise of cyber systems as the backbone of society has led to the information age,

which is more appropriately named the information reliance age. Indeed, one can consider
the simple road map as an example; it is a casualty of the rise of the computerized device.
The average U.S. automobile these days does not contain a road map because of the ease
of using a GPS device or more commonly an individual’s cell phone. Computer networks
infiltrate almost every aspect of people’s lives, running businesses and governments alike.
Almost daily we are given indicators that poor defense of networks creates the possibility of
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disastrous results. A recent occurrence includes Pentagon reports of U.S. weapon systems
being hacked [20]. This reliance is cause for alarm, but only because these systems, that
are so important to people’s daily lives, can be attacked, damaged and destroyed. Less
reliance on computer networks at this point is not a feasible option; therefore, innovations
in security and defense must continue.
On April 27th, 2007, the country of Estonia learned this lesson all too well. In response
to the movement of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn and some Soviet-era war graves, Estonia
began to experience a rapidly scaling onslaught on its cyber systems [1]. This was an
especially devastating attack because of Estonia’s reliance on its information technology
infrastructure as they are perhaps the most wired country on the planet. Government
websites, banking systems, and even media outlets received roughly 100 times more traffic
than they were used to, shutting down availability and having websites defaced [19].
Their dependence upon the cyber infrastructure to provide almost all services to their
people could have easily resulted in total disarray. Fortunately for Estonia, their Computer
Emergency Response Team was able to shore up defenses and eventually mitigate the
attacks. “[Estonia] Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo said in Washington that U. S. officials
told him Estonia coped better with the attack than the United State would have under
similar circumstance” [16]. Although the culture of the U. S. is moving toward full cyber
integration, it is not yet at the level present in Estonia so it is unclear if an attack of this
scale would be as disruptive. However, the lessons learned are a wakeup call that improved
defensive measures are necessary for the defense of computer networks.
The ability of cyber attacks to do more than disrupt networks and steal or destroy data
came to light in late 2009. The advent of the Stuxnet worm is evidence as to how a designed
attack can affect physical systems as it was able to destroy some of the centrifuges of Iran’s
nuclear program. Targeting the programmable logic controller (PLC)s, which manage
industrial systems, the malware reprograms how hardware operates within the system
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which can cause undesirable effects [35]. The sophistication of this level of attack shows
how the integration of computer systems that control hardware leads to vulnerabilities
that can be exploited from outside those physical systems. These Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were once easily protected by locating in remote
settings and great amounts of physical security; however, with the increasing use of Internet
connections by local networks even one outside connection can be enough access for an
attacker [28]. The threats against computer systems are no longer isolated to just the
information present on the systems themselves, but now SCADA systems that run essential
services for a nation’s citizens are in danger. This underscores the need for reliable defense
systems that enable the discovery and quick mitigation of threats.

Figure 1.1: Number of incidents reported to US-CERT 2006-2012 [56]

3

The future seems clear enough, attacks on computer systems will only increase. The
number of incidents reported to United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT) increases every year (Figure 1.1). A large portion of the reason for this
is the ever expanding motivation for attacks. Motives range from the simple desire
for profiteering (criminal) to furthering political goals through protest and reduction of
government operations (hacktivism) and all the way up to nation sponsored attacks against
other nations (warfare) [14]. Hacking has come a long way from the simple lone youth
down in the basement causing mischief. Organized swaths of intelligent computer savvy
attackers now exist and use their abilities to further the goals of their criminal organization
or nation-state. Chris Inglis, National Security Agency deputy director, is quoted as saying,
“If your security depends upon a static advantage and the static nature of compliance-based
standards, your heart’s going to be broken on a fairly regular basis” [17]. Not only has the
game changed, but the landscape continues to evolve and the game being played becomes
more complex. In fact, the continual battle for network dominance between attackers and
defenders can been seen as precisely that, a game [46]. This view has led in recent years to
the rise of game theory being applied to cyber operations and defense.
1.2

History of Game Theory
1.2.1

Beginnings of Game Theory.

Although roots of the ideas behind game theory exist as far back as the first centuries
of A.D., the first truly known minimax mixed strategy solution (a solution where percentage
choices of strategies by players lead to a predictable outcome) to a card game exists in a
letter by Francis Waldegrave in 1713 [53]. He provides a solution to a two-person version
of le Her, but does not extend the concept beyond this game. Some small developments
continued to be made, but it was in 1920s that Émile Borel showed that solutions could be
generalized for two-player games. John von Newmann expanded this concept by proving
the minimax theorem and established game theory as a field of study in the 1940s [37].
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Over the decade much work would be done in research of game theory concepts. The most
influential breakthrough would happen at the hands of a troubled genius, John F. Nash, Jr.
1.2.2

Nash Equilibrium.

Nash provided game theorists with an insight that to this day permeates all branches
of game theory research. He proved the existence of a strategic equilibrium for noncooperative games that ended up being name after him, the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Simply
stated, the NE is the set of strategy selections such that no player can increase their game
payoff by changing strategy [36]. Thus it is not profitable to select a different strategy,
because the reward for doing so is less than the reward for another strategy when taking
into account the other player’s action. The most impressive and useful concept to arise from
this is that allowing mixed strategies (assigning a percentage choice to available player
strategies) to be included means that at a minimum one NE exists in any finite game. This
means that given full knowledge of the game’s players, strategies and payoffs, any player
can maximize their available utility.
1.2.3

Rational Players.

The players who use this knowledge to obtain the best outcome possible are described
as being rational. A rational player has no reason to deviate from the NE because doing so
would reduce the payoff that he or she hopes to obtain. This concept of a rational decision
becomes very important in certain games. In the situation where I know the rules and
strategies of the game, and I know you know the rules and strategies of the game, and
you know that I know that you know, etc., then following the strategy sets outlined by
the NE is the expected way to play the game. If a player acts irrationally, then his or her
opponent will easily gain more utility and ‘win’ the game. However, what happens when
all this information is not known to both sides can be very unpredictable. Actions by one
player can be misinterpreted to be irrational because each side has differing views of the
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same game. Thus, a player may seem to be irrational to the opposition, but may in fact be
operating in a rational manner according to a different view of the game.
1.2.4

Hypergame Theory.

Hypergame theory is an extension of game theory that addresses the kind of games
where misperception exists. The term hypergame was coined by P. G. Bennett in 1977
and seeks to explain how players in a game can have differing views of the conflict [11].
This advance in game theory shows how one player can believe decisions by the other
to be irrational, but the opponent is actually making a rational decision based upon the
perceived game setup. After its introduction it was used to model past military conflicts,
where misperceptions existed, to show how the outcomes were achieved. Options selected
by each side in the conflict are shown to be the rational choice by way of defining the game
that each side perceived. In this manner, the hypergame analysis shows why unexpected
results were obtained when one or both sides misconstrue the conflict. Hypergame analysis
offers advantageous reasoning of strategy selection through situational awareness.
1.3

Application of Game Theory to Research
Although the name ‘game theory’ implies that the concepts expressed should apply to

games, the ideas have been appropriated to many areas. At its heart, a game is just a conflict
between two or more participants vying for the best possible outcome for themselves. The
investigation of the competition between species has given rise to evolutionary game theory.
Even evolutionary game theory itself has evolved to be applied to economics, sociology,
and anthropology [7]. Application of game theory principles can be used wherever there is
a contest over resources or something of worth. Even when there is cooperation between
those involved in the conflict game theory can still model the outcome. At worst, game
theory provides a rationale for the players to select strategies that offer avoidance of the
least desirable results. This is where hypergame theory goes beyond standard game theory
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by providing the means to outmaneuver an opponent, gain better utility, and still avoid
unwanted results.
There have been studies applying game theory to terrorist activities of which certainly
cyber attacks can be included. Terrorist activities are by nature covert and the conflict
between them and governments can easily be seen as games of incomplete information [42].
Unfortunately much of the work that has been done in these studies fails to focus
on incomplete and imperfect information games.

This is an emerging field and the

complexities involved in network security cannot be done by human analysis alone,
computer assistance is required [33]. The inclusion of misperception and misinformation
in this fight points to usefulness of hypergame theory because it provides strategy selection
techniques that mitigate potential risks. Hypergame analysis is endowed with the tools
that enable strategists to perform better than the worst case scenario and improve their
position within the game [50]. The coupling of hypergame procedures with the speed
and reliability of computer calculations can increase the ability of human administrators to
protect networks.
It is clear that one of the biggest challenges in the cyber security game is establishing
predictive analysis tools to assist against threats [56]. This goal of this research is to
provide a foundation for the use of hypergame theory for adaptable cyber defense systems
able to adjust to the existence of misperceptions and misinformation. A general game
model envisioning a cyber attack and defense scenario that builds upon previous research
efforts is expanded into a hypergame model. The model is used to demonstrate software
written to give computer assistance for hypergame analysis. Application of the hypergame
theory model is set against a game-based software simulated conflict by various types of
attackers and defense techniques giving a quantifiable indication of hypergame analysis
strategy selection. The game-based software simulation is achieved by running iterations
of the game model where adaptability of strategy selection is the key focus. In the end,
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this research gives initial evidence that using hypergame analysis allows network defense
to adapt to the type of attacker faced in the fight for security.
1.4

Document Overview
In chapter 2, Literature Review of Game Theory Research, various efforts in the arena

of cyber warfare analysis with game theoretic models are assessed. An in depth discussion
on game theory models is provided with an emphasis on design techniques. Previous
research in the application of game theory to cyber security is reviewed as evidence of its
usefulness in this arena. Hypergame theory extends basic game theory principles and the
advances it provides over standard game theory are discussed. Several forms of hypergame
theory are reviewed showing the robustness of its relevance for conflict analysis. Finally,
the plausibility of applying hypergame theory to cyber warfare is examined.
Chapter 3, Hypergame Model and Software Design Methodology, presents the
reasoning behind the game architecture, software development, and the experimental plan.
Various features of game theory model design are discussed and decisions on their use are
made. The model, using the features selected, is formulated with a basis laid upon previous
research efforts. Software design decisions, that result in the creation of the software used
to instantiate the model and provide experimental output, are analyzed.
Chapter 4, HAT Software Experiment Design Methodology, describes the experiments
that are performed with the game model and custom software. Pre-experiment tests are
formulated that test the game model requirements and ensure that the software meets them.
An experimental plan is devised that incorporates the game model and examines various
game setups that may be encountered in cyber defense scenarios.
Chapter 5, HAT Software Experiment Results, reviews the outcome of the experiments
outlined in the experimental plan. Pre-experimental test results, designed to ensure that
the created software is functioning as required, are outlined first. Basic tests are next
and provide a backdrop of base values upon which further tests are judged. Iterative
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testing follows showing how game outcomes change after playing several in a row. Lastly,
experiments are run to examine how updated values affect the player’s strategy choices
during game execution. The results of all experiments are then discussed to give credence
to the applicability of hypergame theory in the arena of cyber warfare.
Chapter 6, Conclusions, gives discussion based on the experiments and what the future
will hold for this area of research. The findings provided by the experiments are examined
under the lens of their usefulness for cyber security. The effectiveness of the results and
recommendations on their application are provided. Suggestions for future research using
hypergame theory are prescribed. Also, ideas on the future use and expansion of the
software used to perform the experiments herein, including any current known issues, is
offered.
1.5

Summary
The state of cyber operations is discussed with emphasis on recent events and the

possibilities of future catastrophes. The need for security of networks is shown to lie in the
hands of trustworthy cyber defense mechanisms. The history of game theory shows that
it is a reasonable approach to modeling decision making and determining the outcomes of
conflicts. Game theory has been used to understand various applications in areas as diverse
as military endeavors, economics and biology. Hypergame theory is a branch of game
theory that focuses on conflict resolution when there are misperceptions by one or more
players in a game. Most recently, game theory has begun to be applied to the area of cyber
warfare. This new area of research shows promise in its ability to analyze situations that
may allow for better cyber defenses. The application of game theory, and more specifically
hypergame theory, to cyber defense of computer networks is the focus of this research.
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II.

T

Literature Review of Game Theory Research

here is a large body of work of studies involving game theory. Specific interest in
the area of game theoretic models applied to cyber security is covered within this

chapter. Additionally the focus of the research involves hypergame theory so much research
in this area is examined. Other areas of game theory that involve cyber security applications
are touched on.
2.1

Game Theory
Game theory is used to model diverse areas such as economics, natural selection,

battles in past wars, and many other types of conflict [37]. The main influence behind the
creation of game theory is the resolution of such competitions. Game theory models have
many properties associated with them that influence the outcome and how game analysis
proceeds. Cooperative games can exist where there is communication between players, but
more often games are seen as non-cooperative where the players do not attempt to give up
any information to their rivals. Simultaneous games are when players make decisions at
essentially the same time and do not know of the opponent’s move in advance (i.e. rock,
paper, scissors). Conversely sequential games are when the opponent’s move is known
before a decision is made (i.e. betting in poker or chess). Perfect information versus
imperfect information is when all previous moves are known to all players instead of some
being hidden. These previous two concepts are often confused with complete information
and incomplete information, which are actually intended to be the knowledge of all player’s
strategies and payoffs. The payoffs, also known as utilities, also have a common property
of zero sum or non-zero sum. When the utility values for each player are directly opposite,
it is considered a zero sum and a clear winner can be determined. When utility values are
not opposite, non-zero sum, all players involved can gain or lose and it may be difficult to
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ascertain the winner. These properties are just a few of the main defined for game theory,
but a large portion of a game theory model definition comes from its form.

Figure 2.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma : A strategic game example

Figure 2.2: An extensive form game example [10]

The majority of game theory models are identified as either strategic, used to represent
a simultaneous game, or extensive games, more often used to represent a sequential game
even though it can represent simultaneous as well. Strategic games have utilities that
are determined by which strategy is selected by each player. When a player’s strategy
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is selected all strategies are available to choose from and therefore the game is represented
in a grid or matrix format (Figure 2.1). Extensive games’ outcomes are instead represented
as a tree structure where the initial player is at the top with branches leading off for
each strategy available, and then the next player has strategies available from each branch
creating branches for each of its strategies available (Figure 2.2). All strategies that a player
can use, may or may not be available at a particular node of the tree dependent upon the
previous player’s selected strategy.

Figure 2.3: The game of chicken

The simplest way to analyze outcomes of games is to assign values to each player’s
utility values that are static and do not depend upon any variation. These static utility values
allow the math to be straightforward and provide quick discovery of Nash equilibriums.
The formal equation is:
∗
∗
)
∀i, xi ∈ S i : fi (xi∗ , x−i
) ≥ fi (xi , x−i

(2.1)

Where i is the specific player, S i is the player’s strategy set, and fi (x) is the payoff function.
Let xi be the strategy profile of i and x−i be the strategy profile of all other players. A weak
NE means that for at least one player another strategy set leads to the same result. A strict
NE is when there is only one strategy set to reach the result and no player can change their
strategy, otherwise the result also changes. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)
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in a strategic game, for example, has a relatively uncomplicated procedure for discovering
whether or not one exists. Each strategy of a player is examined to see the maximum
utility that is obtained given the other player’s strategy choice. When the players’ strategic
choices coincide there exists a PSNE at those strategy selections. The game of chicken, see
Figure 2.3, illustrates this concept, where the underlined utility values are the best choice
for a player given that the other player has selected the corresponding strategy. Given that
the other player chooses swerve there is no incentive to swerve as well, so the strategy
choice is straight, 1 > 0. However, when the other player chooses straight, the strategy
choice most beneficial is swerve, −1 > −10. Therefore, in the game of chicken there are
two PSNE, showing that with static utility values the operation can be straightforward.
When no PSNE exist the calculation of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is more
complex, but with matrix operations even somewhat complex games can have at least one
Nash Equilibrium (NE) found within a reasonable amount of time.

Figure 2.4: Hawk-Dove game, illustrating the use of functions for utility values

Static utility for games are used as a way of simplifying a game model for analysis.
Therefore, the replacement of these values with functions makes the analysis a complicated
endeavor. An example of this is the Hawk-Dove game where the addition of variation in
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the utility that a player will receive upon selection in most cases alters the equilibriums
and thus the decision of the best strategy choice, see Figure 2.4. Both the hawk and the
dove require the resource (V), food, but a fight over the resource by two hawks results in
a cost (C), injury. In the analysis of NE it can be shown that if V/2C > 0 then the hawk
strategy strictly dominates and both players will select it. However, when the opposite is
true, V/2 − C < 0, the equilibriums are drastically different. There are two PSNE, hawkdove and dove-hawk, but there is also the addition of the MSNE where each player chooses
hawk V/2C percent of the time and dove 1 − V/2C percent [47]. The advantage of variable
utility modeling over static utilities is that it can describe a real world situation in more
detail than the static values. As the value of a variable changes from game to game (i.e.
food valuation could depend upon supply) it has impact on strategy selection.
A game worthy of note that encompasses some of the ideas discussed is that of cops
and robbers, more formally known as pursuit-evasion games. The game consists of cop and
robber teams where the robber attempts to evade the cop and win by never being caught,
while the cop wins when the robber is captured. Usually this game is presented on a graph,
G, where there are vertices which the players occupy and move between and if they ever
occupy the same vertex the cop wins. This game is often modeled using graph theory, like
in [5] to provide winning strategy analysis. However, as shown by Kahn in [30], a game
theoretic model can be used to describe the competition. The game is formally defined by
using the extensive form, zero-sum and perfect-information. It is shown how a non-game
theory model of a game can be transformed into a game theoretic model. Also of interest
here is that the idea of the pursuit-evasion game is applicable to real world situations. It is
not unlike the detection of invaders present in network nodes by a system’s defenses.
2.2

Game Theory Applied to Cyber Security
The increasing incidents of network intrusion are influencing the rapid evolution of

both malware and defense techniques. As noted in [46] this coevolution is like a game
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between the malware authors and security analysts, each attempting to outperform the other
(thus winning the game). Logically, this leads to the interesting point of view that cyber
threat attacks and the defenses that are put in place to deflect them can be modeled as a game
between two players. Game theory is the tool that enables a mathematical understanding of
the strategy choices that are selected by the attackers and defenders in this competition. A
game that models the struggle between these two adversaries can lend insight into the best
strategy choices for each side. It can even be stated that the side that is most proficient at
understanding the game will gain the upper hand and emerge as the victor.
In general, game theory research conducted to analyze these cyber security situations
focuses on the use of defense techniques to monitor the network for anomalies and mitigate
suspected intrusions. The use of firewalls, passwords, access control lists and other
outer defenses are generally regarded as static defense. These defense mechanisms are
not usually updated dynamically and therefore do no lend themselves especially well to
analysis by the use of game theory principles. Detection of anomalies within the network,
however, requires response to findings and the implementation of changes to defend the
network. These changes, being required at any time in order to combat an emerging
threat, are an excellent reason to consider these operations as candidates for analysis. The
detection of anomalies within the network is put in place to be a second line of defense
to detect intrusions and consequently generate the appropriate responses to the threats that
appear [38]. Malware and attackers that intrude into the system do not wish to be found,
while the defenders are actively searching for these invasions. It is not generally considered
enough to just detect the attack, but it must also be mitigated. Traditional intrusion
detection schemes are not evolved enough for complex detection and are lacking in effective
response strategies; therefore, efficient detection policies and appropriate response policies
need to be logically formalized [6]. Game theoretic analysis is especially well suited for
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formulating these responses because a decision on the best strategy to take follows from
that analysis.
An overview of various approaches to the use of game theory reveals that although
there are many differences in design of the models they all embody a central theme. Game
theory is used to select those security measures providing the lowest incurred cost balanced
with the highest level of security that is able to be achieved [44]. This principle is the main
reason that game theoretic models should be used to influence the decisions that are made
when deciding strategies for network defense. The more open a system is the more it
becomes a liability, while the more security measures imposed on a system reduces its
ability to be used by those that need it. When authorized users are unable to use the system
because the security levels hamper their ability to access the network, it is tantamount to
allowing the attackers victory in the game. Administrators of the system must realize that
when a legitimate user is trying to access the system and cannot, eventually giving up, the
cyber-battle has already been lost [6]. However, there are times when information is at risk
and must be protected that it is crucial to limit access, even for the legitimate users. During
these times, those that necessitate analysis of the trade-offs, game theory modeling can
provide a strategy in which the best balance between security and availability is achievable.
A human administrator can make the decisions necessary that provide the network
defensive capabilities which combat threats and allow users sufficient access to the system.
Computers, on the other hand, can analyze all of the combinations and permutations of
acquired data to find exceptions in general rules. This is in direct contrast to humans
who are very prone to overlooking possibilities [41]. This is not to say that computers
should make the decisions without human interaction, but instead that many factors should
be included in the reasoning behind the resulting conclusions made by the computer’s
analysis of the intrusions. Most importantly, in any computer analysis, the game model
must accurately depict the situation that is being encountered in order to provide an accurate
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response; otherwise, an incorrect strategy is easily selected. A model that is able to at least
come close to the representation of the condition of the network will provide invaluable
information leading to a preferred strategy. This is because the computer analysis of game
theory has the capability of examining hundreds of thousands of possible scenarios before
selecting the best action. Computer analysis sophisticates the decision process of the
network administrator to a large extent [44]. The modeling of the game being played is
the most important aspect of using game theory analysis to implement cyber security. To
this end, much of the research conducted in game theory’s use for cyber operations focuses
on the creation of an applicable model.
The difficulty in creating the appropriate model that represents the attack and defense
of a network is that the number of variables involved can be immense. Thus, most models
simplify the situation so the ideas they focus on can be examined within a reasonable
timeframe and without a multitude of variables affecting the results. This does not mean
that valuable information cannot be gleaned from these examinations, but only that models
will fall short of how many real world situations occur. The simplifications lead to the
majority of models describing two player games, the attacker as one player and the defender
as the other. This is a reasonable expectation because the more players (P) and number of
strategies per player (S ) involved in game theory models requires increasing the number of
game results (r) as shown here in Equation (2.2). The addition of just one player to a game
r = P1 S ∗ P2 S ∗ ... ∗ Pn S

(2.2)

with two strategies for that player results in doubling the number of possible outcomes.
Generally the number of strategies in the model is also kept low because each strategy
added for a player increases the number of outcomes by the total number of other players’
strategies. Therefore, many models tend to be two-player with two strategies each like
in [15] where the attacker can attack or not attack and the defender can defend or not
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defend. This seemingly over-simplification allows an examination of other variables, such
as multiple nodes being attacked or utility values that are equations instead of set values.
Although some models researched do use the extensive model like [43] [8], and some
even examined both extensive and strategic [23] [9], the majority of those examined use
the strategic model as their backbone. The simplicity of strategic models allows for a more
straightforward analysis, but this is not the only reason for the preference over extensive
models. When considering cyber security one must understand that in most cases when an
attack is being precipitated against a network node that is not defended at the time of the
attack it can be difficult to mitigate it. Therefore, an extensive game where moves are made
one at a time does not adequately describe the situation. In the remainder of the research
examine herein, the focus is set on the models that use the strategic approach.
The design of a strategic model consists of two parts, strategy selection and utility
outcome assignment. A typical model views the game as a strategy decision between two
players where each player’s strategy is listed on one side of the grid (Figure 2.1). Once
the strategies are determined, the resulting cells of the framework can be populated with
the utility, or value, that each player will receive when the two outlying strategies have
been used. Commonly when this setup is used in cyber defense analysis the two players
are typically the attacker and defender of a network. A simple design will consist of two
strategies each, attacker can attack or not attack, while the defender can defend or not
defend. A variation of this was used in [9] where the defender actually had a high level of
defense or low level instead of none at all. Also in this variation the game was designed
with static outcome values and there are no variables to change the values over time or
instance. Static utilities provide an easy analysis of game results with rational players
because the NE can easily be found, incidentally the simplicity of the model also impacts
the ease of analysis. Bandyopadhyay and Sebalia show this by easily determining the

18

strictly dominated strategy and the NE of their model. However, as the complexity of a
model is increased, so does the complexity of NE discovery.

Table 2.1: Chen and Lenutre Variables
Variable Symbol

Meaning

a

Detection Rate

b

False Alarm Rate

Ca

Cost of Attack

Cf

Cost of False Alarm

Cm

Cost of Monitoring

Wi

Value of Target

The variable utility approach was selected by Chen and Leneutre [15] in their
examination of intrusion detection for heterogeneous networks. Their model retains the
simplicity of using a two-player game, attacker and defender, and two strategies each,
attack/not attack and defend/not defend, but the utility values are based upon variables. The
variables they selected to determine the utilities are shown in Table 2.1. The assignment of
functions to the game grid using these values allows the authors to show how in a real world
situation a rational attacker will only have an inclination to attack the higher value targets.
The subsequent analysis of the NE proves this by showing that whenever the target is not
in the rational target set, the MSNE percentage for attack or defend drops to zero. Under
the assumption that both the attacker and defender have sufficient resources to engage each
other over the entire target set the NE becomes:



∗
∗


 U A (p , q ) = 0



f +C m P N

 U D (p∗ , q∗ ) = − bC
j=1 W j
2a+bC f
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(2.3)

The conclusion of this analysis is that increasing attack or monitoring does not change
the NE and the attacker does not gain from a decrease in the attack cost. In order to
decrease costs the defender must increase performance by improving detection rate and/or
decreasing false alarms. Improvement can also be implemented by a reduction of the costs
involved. These factors show that the application of formulae to utility values can provide
valuable insight on how to prepare for the game and improve a player’s performance.
2.3

Hypergame Theory
The critical factor that standard game theory analysis is missing, however, is the ability

to see past the simple game and model the fact that one player may have an advantage
over the other. The previous research discussion does not focus on the fact that not all
information may be present to all parties involved in the game. Indeed, there can be many
levels to a game that involve a kind of meta-strategy that requires subterfuge allowing
one player to disrupt the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop of the other [29]. The
concept of not allowing the other player to fully grasp the strategies employed by the other
is what has given rise to the study of the meta-game, also known as hypergame theory.
Hypergame theory examines the fact that a player may have the tactical advantage of
knowing that there is in actuality a larger game with more strategies that can be selected,
there is a reasonable expectation that their opponent will choose a specific strategy instead
of others, or that the opponent expects a certain strategy to be chosen.
Hypergame analysis extends game theory by providing for the larger game that is
really being played whether or not both players are aware of it. A different game model
can represent each player’s view of the conflict, but more often than not these models will
overlap where their knowledge is common. Figuring out what strategy a player will use
is dependent upon not only his or her observation of the game, but also how that player
believes the opposition is viewing the game. This creates many different game models that
are examined for the solution to be obtained. The goal of hypergame analysis is to provide
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insight into real world situations that are often more complex than a game where the choices
of strategy present themselves as obvious. The beginnings of hypergame analysis began
by the examination of completed situations where perception and information differences
existed between the parties involved. It is much easier in hindsight, where all choices and
outcomes have been determined, to achieve understanding of these kinds of situation.
It comes as no surprise that the initial foray into hypergame theory examines past
military conflicts, which are prone to having misperceptions and missing information in
the process of their unfolding. Analysis of past conflicts also lends itself to ease of
understanding since the fog of war has cleared and the outcome has been determined.
In this regard, Bennett and Dando [12] examined the fall of France due to the attack of
German forces in 1940. They began by asking the question of why were the Allies not
prepared for such a bold attack by the Germans. Their determination was that the Allies
had discounted the option of an attack through the Ardennes, which resulted in the Allies
misperception of the situation. The Germans, on the other hand, were taking a broader
view and perceived a meta-game that encompassed the strategy option that the allied forces
had discounted. Thus by being able to determine that the French would discount such an
action, the German’s were able to turn what was a rational decision by the Allies against
them (Figure 2.5). The French player, only able to “see” the game on the left follows the

Figure 2.5: Bennett and Dando’s Hypergame representation of the fall of France [12]

NE and determines that F2 is the acceptable choice. The German player, knowing that this
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is the French player’s rationale, realizes this and selects strategy G3 from the game on the
right providing the best possible outcome for Germany. The outcome of such an analysis
can show that each player can make what appears to be a rational decision on strategy
choice, but that a misperception by a player can prove that choice to be a poor decision.
Hipel et al. [24] take another approach in their examination of the Falkland/Malvinas
conflict between Britain and Argentina in 1982. They provide a hypergame analysis of
the evolution of the conflict that shows that misperceptions by both sides can lead to an
outcome that is unexpected by both players. Because each side makes choices without a
view of the full hypergame neither player gains the benefit they were hoping to achieve
through their strategy choice. The most interesting point of this analysis is that the game
is viewed over time where choices made affect the next iteration of the game, providing
different options and outcomes. Game changes based upon these changes are incorporated
into the evolution of the game grid and information is gleaned at each step by the players.
Eventually, the hypergame is reduced to a simple game because misperceptions fall away
as both sides become aware of the remaining options and outcomes. However, this analysis
and modeling, as well as that in c̃itehgtFall is relatively straight forward when one examines
a conflict where all decisions and outcomes are known a priori. In order for hypergame
theory to be useful when examining future conflicts, models which can represent these
situations without previous knowledge require discussion.
The hypergame model attempts to create a vision of the players’ understanding about
the nature of the game being played. The model, once set forth, is then used to reason about
the strategy selection of those players involved. Wang et al. [54] are at the forefront of the
efforts to quantify how the hypergame model is designed. In their modeling the hypergame
is divided into different levels of game perceptions. At the lowest (0 level) there exists
the basic game where there are no misperceptions. The first-level hypergame introduces
the first misperceptions, where the players have different games, but are unaware of the
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other players’ games (much like the game of the Falkland/Malvinas conflict from [24]). A
second-level hypergame is where at least one player knows that there are different games
being played (the Fall of France from [12] for instance). They also describe a third-level
in which at least one player knows that other players know there are different games being
played. The authors admit that a nth level hypergame can be described, but this would most
likely be an over-complication of the model and unnecessary for analysis. The analysis of
this model technique does not ensure that the outcomes have the same meaning for each
player as a basic game theory analysis would. Instead the equilibrium can be transient as
iterations of the game are played and the perceptions of the players change.
This modeling technique is further examined in [55] where the stability analysis of the
hypergame is fully defined for n-players. Through these definitions the authors describe the
various ways in which stability, a game equilibrium, is reached and why these outcomes
exist. Nash stability exists when players make decisions that are rational (R) based on the
outcome that suits the player. However, a player’s perceptions can affect the true outcome
and Nash stability is more likely to be achieved when misperceptions do not exist. There
are also general metarational (GMR) and symmetric metarational (SMR) game outcomes
for GMR where other players have a joint response for player i and that player can achieve
no better outcome than the original and where SMR there exists one jointly sequential
strategy selection to pin player i to the same result. Finally an outcome is considered to be
sequential stable (FHQ) when there is a response to a particular player’s strategy that puts
that player in no better position, but also the responding player cannot be put in a worse
position. A graphic representation of these definitions Figure 2.6 shows their relationships.
The most significant finding in the author’s discussion is that an FHQ outcome exists in
every level of the hypergame, which also means that a GMR outcome must also exist.
In [52], Dr. Russell Vane III offers a different approach to hypergame modeling
by providing the incorporation of a player’s beliefs on opponent’s possible actions. He
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Figure 2.6: Individual Stability Concepts in n-person Hypergames [55]

also provides a graphic representation of the hypergame that is reminiscent of the normal
strategic form used in standard game theory analysis. The new model is referred to as
Hypergame Normal Form (HNF), see Figure 2.7. The full game is the familiar grid
form with row and column strategies labeled and the utility values (u11 - unm ) in the cells
cross referenced from the strategies. The additional sections are the hypergame situational
information. The Row Mixed Strategy (RMS)s are hyperstrategies gleaned from what the
row player believes about the game being played by the column player. They are called
hyperstrategies because they do not encompass the view of the full game, except for R0
which is the full game NE. The Column Mixed Strategy (CMS)s are row’s belief about the
mixed strategy percentages that column will play when selecting a strategy. C0 is column’s
NE view of the full game. When a CMS cell contains a 0, this is an indication that there
is a sub-game that column is believed to be playing where the corresponding strategies are
either unknown to column or discounted as not worthwhile. The final section is the beliefcontexts, which correspond to the percentage of which row believes that the adjacent CMS
will be played by column. Since they are percentages the belief-contexts will sum up to
one, with the sum of values P1 through PK−1 being at most 1 and the leftover constitutes the
NE belief-context. Filling in the HNF with the values associated with the game provides
the avenue for the hypergame analysis.
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Figure 2.7: The Hypergame Normal Form [52]

Determining the utility values allows for a NE for the full game to be calculated which
provides the input into R0 and C0 . CMSs are then entered in the section above the full game.
A CMS can be determined manually, i.e. knowing a player’s preference for selecting rock
in a game of rock, paper, scissors, or a NE for the column player can be used from the
analysis of the sub-game that the column player is believed to be using. Each CMS is
assigned a belief-context value which serves to weight the row player’s belief that column
will choose that CMS. These values are used to calculate CP , the aggregate amount which
directly affects the expected utility that row hopes to achieve. Row’s hyperstrategies are
then input into the RMS section. Expected utility values for each strategy set listed in the
RMS section are calculated for the full game NE CMS, C0 , and the aggregate belief CMS,
CP . These values determine the effectiveness for which an RMS hyperstrategy is a practical
selection for row to apply.
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RMS effectiveness is categorized into three levels of usefulness: fully effective,
partially effective, and ineffective (Figure 2.8). A fully effective strategy set will provide
at worst case the same expected utility that row’s R0 strategy set achieves for C0 , but has
a greater expected utility at CP . Thus, given that row is viewing the game correctly a
fully effective RMS is always a good choice. Partially effective strategy sets also provide
a greater expected utility at CP than R0 , but have a lower utility expectation at C0 . Given
row’s information, a partially effective RMS could provide a good outcome, but it is not
always assured. The ineffective strategy set provides for no increase in utility and at best
can only get to that expected by the NE, so there is no reason to select it. It is reasonable
to assume that fully effective strategies sets should always be used, but that doesn’t mean
there isn’t some inherent risks involved because the utility values are only expected and not
foolproof. Worst case scenarios can also be included in this determination to help mitigate
risk.

Figure 2.8: Effectiveness of hyperstrategies in HNF [52]

Risk assessment is built into the hypergame analysis through a method termed
quantified outguessing. This method introduces the fear of the player that he or she
26

will be out maneuvered and the worst case utility will be the end result. Three types
of hyperstrategy sets are described for this analysis: Modeling Opponent (MO), Pick
Subgame (PS), and Weighted Subgame (WS). MO is simply selecting the strategy for
row that will provide the highest utility given all of row’s strategy selections and when
considering the belief of how column views the game. In contrast, the PS strategy set
consists of the NE for the same game view that was considered for MO. WS uses the PS
strategy values multiplied by the belief-context percentage for that CMS and adds the R0
multiplied by the belief-context for C0 , which results in a hybrid strategy set between PS
and the MSNE for the full game. Each hyperstrategy is then assessed against the full game
to quantify the worst case utility (G), or the utility value expected when column selects
the correct counter strategy. The Expected Utility (EU) and G, once determined, allow the
Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU) to be calculated by also considering g, the percentage
chance row feels that he or she will be outguessed (Equation (2.4)). As can be seen the
distance between EU and G has a quantifiable affect on the value of HEU for the
HEU(hs) = EU(hs) − (EU(hs) − G(hs)) ∗ g
hyperstrategy (hs).

(2.4)

As the fear of being outguessed increases the ability of any

hyperstrategy to provide better utility that the MSNE solution to the full game decreases
(Figure 2.9). The lower the fear of being outguessed MO is the best selection, but as
that fear increases eventually PS dominates for a short period until the Crossover Point
where MSNE for the full game is dominant (note that WS is always dominated and does
not provide a suitable choice). Therefore, with good information on the intent of the
adversary, hyperstrategy selection that provides better utility than standard game analysis
is achievable.
Some further research in the use of the HNF have been performed after its creation.
The ideas about hypergame analysis are expanded upon in [51] by Vane himself. The
presence of luck and robustness of strategy plan are examined, but for the most part it
27

Figure 2.9: HEU value changes dependent on the value of g [52]

provides further evidence of the usefulness of hypergame analysis for the strategy selection
process. A real world example of how to use the HNF is provided in [50], which examines
a terrorist attack. The analysis entails applying belief-context values to expected types of
attackers so that a strategic decision can be made to best protect first responders. This
reiterates the idea that uncertainty exists and needs to be assessed when planning. Perhaps
the most interesting application of the HNF is in c̃itehgtUsing where it is used to model the
fall of France in 1940. The model is compared to the dual standard game model presented
in [12] and to a preference vector model like that in [24]. Specifically it is outlined that
using the HNF approach allows all information to continue to be presented and not removed
from the model. Even when a strategy is completely discounted by applying a percentage
chance of use of zero, it remains in the total game MSNE analysis and is not completely
removed from the model. These research efforts show a glimpse of the usefulness of the
HNF.
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2.4

Hypergame Theory Applied to Cyber Warfare
Unfortunately very little in the way of hypergame theory application has been done

in the arena of cyber warfare. Although much recent work has used game theoretical
applications in an attempt to model network security, the use of hypergame theory is not
considered on the same level. Hints to its effectiveness have been suggested. Certainly, a
computer-based tool can provide easy access to information [50]. It is easily conceivable
that an cyber defense system can be infused with a hypergame model in order to influence
decisions on network defense. Even Vane, although not in a sense directed at defense
agents, suggests that hypergame theory should be used for decision theory and game theory
agents [49]. Evidence tends to point out that, given credible information, hypergame theory
can do no worse than game theory models, but has the potential to outdo them. Providing
a computer-based tool the ability to analyze a situation with a hypergame model creates a
quick and efficient technique for strategy selection.
There has been at least a small amount of work performed in the use of hypergame
theory applied to cyber warfare. House and Cybenko in their paper [25] use hypergame
theory to model a generic cyber attack where the defender can choose a specific subgame
or the full game dependent upon the experience level of the current defending administrator.
Their model is designed using Dr. Vane’s HNF, static utility values, and with the row player
as the attacker. Using learning models it is shown that row can eventually determine the
percentages, which in the HNF are the belief-contexts, that each subgame is being used.
In simulations the results indicate that within 3000 to 5000 iterations these percentages are
known within ± 5% of the actual usage percentages. These results show that there is at
least some measure of confidence that using a learning strategy that one player can begin to
understand the strategy selection of the other. This represents the ability to understand one’s
adversary in order to select one’s own strategy to provide the best possibility at maximum
utility.
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The research does not conclude with these findings. Instead, the possibility of the
defender (or column player in this case) obfuscating the learning ability of the attacker is
examined. It is shown that there does exist at least a limited ability for the column player,
using an obfuscation MSNE, to disrupt the ability for row to learn column’s true usage
percentages. This obfuscation MSNE is created by remodeling the utility values that were
present in the initial row learning experiments. The result is that row will have a more
difficult process by which to determine the strategy that has been played against it in each
iteration. This approach is somewhat manufactured in order to provide column with the
ability to select strategies that may be misinterpreted. However, the fact that payoffs and
subgame definitions are the heart of any hypergame scenario is presented as the reason for
this approach.
The results of this research effort are of most interest due to the usage of hypergame
theory in the attempt to model a cyber warfare situation more than the actual content of the
findings. House and Cybenko do not use the full HNF model, choosing to concentrate on
learning the nature of the game through play instead of attempting to outguess the opponent
as discussed in [52]. Despite this fact, the usage of the HNF to model the experiments
shows the viability of the model to be incorporated into network defense initiatives. More
avenues of the use of hypergame theory and specifically of models using the HNF are
required to prove the effectiveness of the approach. The exploration of how hypergame
theory can affect cyber defense and offense is only in its infancy.
2.5

Summary
Game theory has been used to model many things in the world. Although the roots

of the theory lay in the 16th century, it wasn’t until Jon von Neumann founded the field
in 1928 with his proof of the minimax theorem of the zero-sum games with perfect
information. From these humble beginnings it grew to encompass economics, business,
biology, and many more areas. In the 1950s John Nash expanded the field to encompass
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strategy selection of players for more generalized games with his description of strategy
equilibriums (known as the NE). Games have many aspects to them, but each must have a
type of form. The most common of these forms are extensive and strategic.
In recent years the concepts that embody game theory have begun to be applied in
the area of cyber security. This is mostly due to the view that attackers and defenders of a
network are in a sense playing a game, with each trying to gain the upper hand upon the
other in the struggle to control the network. In order to keep analysis simple, game model
designs are often basic, using two players with two strategies each and static utility values.
Real world situations are usually more complex than this and Chen and Lenutre [15] use
a more extensive model including variables to more adequately reproduce conditions that
would be found in a real network defense system. Their approach still only examines a
simple attack/not attack and defend/not defend strategy selection.
Hypergame theory expands upon the ideas that are the foundation of game theory. It
models complex situations in which at least one party is unaware that there are different
games being played by the players involved in the game. Work in this area has grown
around the analysis of military conflicts where there exists much misinformation and
deception. Models have been examined that allow for the analysis of hypergame conflicts
in the effort to find why a situation was reached, or how a best outcome can be gained.
Dr. Vane’s HNF is introduced as not only a method for hypergame analysis, but also
as a strategy selection tool that considers the risk of being outguessed. Research using
the HNF is examined to show that it can be used to model previous work as well as real
world situations. The benefits of hypergame theory over game theory is shown to be the
possibility of better utility than that available by strictly following the MSNE and why this
is achievable.
Only a small amount of research is currently being performed with the application
of hypergame theory for cyber warfare. Although efforts have been few, it has been
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recommended several times that more attempts using hypergame theory applied to cyber
warfare should be made. House and Cybenko have provided some insight as to how this
theory can give credence to the approach, even though their research was limited in its
application. Through their efforts, the use of the HNF is shown to be a feasible modeling
technique for the performance of experiments in this arena. Further research into the use
of hypergame theory for cyber defense and offense needs to be accomplished because little
has yet been done.
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III.

D

Hypergame Model and Software Design Methodology

esign of a hypergame theory model that shows the viability for the application of
the theory for cyber security is a vital portion of this endeavor. The mix of game

properties selected determines the structure of the model. Various software packages are
considered as the component that allows for model evaluation and simulation. Software
must meet the requirements ascribed by the model to be a viable option.
3.1

Game Theory Method Selection
Game theory has been shown to be effective in its application to various kinds of

real world situations from economics to biology [37]. The situation that arises in a battle
over network control by the owners and those seeking to abuse it lends itself to a game
perspective. This makes the decision to apply a game theoretic approach to an analysis of
this confrontation an interesting endeavor, but there remains the question of how to proceed
in modeling the conflict. There are many ways within game theory to model a game made
up of players and strategies and surely there is not necessarily one “best” way to accomplish
this goal. A design that incorporates these ideas in a way that is usable and practical is an
important feature when a study is undertaken. Thus, the varying attributes of game theory
are examined and the reasons for the selections used are discussed.
The most influential aspect of any game theory design is its form, which represents the
players and strategies that are used to depict the conflict. As previously discussed, the most
common of these forms are the extensive and strategic structures. Extensive games are
modeled in a tree design and the more strategies available to players, the more expansive
this representation becomes, see 2.1. A complex extensive game design can easily get out of
control in terms of its size and ease of being understood. The strategic form offers a design
that accommodates the addition of strategies more readily by way of its matrix layout. The
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determination of utility outcomes is quickly available by the cross referencing of player’s
selected strategies. Extensive form games are also considered best for application to turnbased games like chess, while strategic form is better suited for simultaneous move games.
Although cyber security could be considered in a turn-based fashion because moves
can be influenced by preceding events, the situation lends itself more to a simultaneous
environment due to defensive measures already being in place as an attack occurs. Strategic
form also lends itself to game play in which two players are involved, keeping the design in
an easy to read matrix and this is the consideration herein. However, the strategic form does
not limit the players to two. It can be expanded in a manner that is still understandable,
as evidenced by a multi-player output used by the game analysis software Gambit, see
Figure 3.1 [34]; however the complexity expands as the number of players increases. In
a real world scenario it may be that there is more than a single party attacking a network,
but it is often difficult to delineate attackers separately so considering all attacks as a single
entity is not without merit. Also in this situation the defender is considered as a single
entity, the network owner. Although limiting the players in the conflict is a simplification
of reality, this abstraction allows for a more manageable and timely analysis [27]. These
reasons lead to the decision to base this research investigation and its model on the strategic
form with two players.
Another aspect of the model that bears much of its weight is that of how the utility
values are determined; see the discussion on utility values in 2.1. Zero-sum and nonzerosum games are both considered when designing the experimental model. Zero-sum games
by their nature define a game in which one side always wins and the other side loses on
any particular outcome. This kind of approach does not provide for the situation where
each side can gain some from a particular combination of strategy choices. Certainly when
one considers a real world situation it can be shown that this is a possibility. Consider a
cyber attack in which damage is done or information is lost to the defender, but in which
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Figure 3.1: Three-player zero-sum Rock/Paper/Scissors game in Gambit’s form

the defender gains valuable insight into the attacker. In this instance the defender may have
lost some utility value, but both sides have also gained and this does not fit the model of
a zero-sum situation. The incorporation of this possibility requires that the game be based
upon a nonzero-sum utility representation.
Consideration to designing the utility outcomes for the game must also take into
account the quantities that are involved. Static representation of numbers allows a game
designer to show not only that a certain strategy combination is better or worse for the
players than others, but also by how much. However, the values to assign to the strategy
choices may not reflect environmental influences. Like the situation in the Hawk-Dove
game where resources can change over game iterations, see Figure 2.4 on page 13, a
computer network is a landscape that can change over time. Indeed, nodes can be added and
removed as computers go up and come down, even the value of a specific node can change
due to the information stored on it or its position in a topology [15]. Utility values that are
based upon functions grant the model with a simple way to be influenced by environmental
changes. The use of variables in these functions shows how certain aspects of the defender
and attacker control the values associated with the payoffs achieved. The functional utility
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design is therefore more useful in the analysis of game outcomes for this experimental
design.
As for the use of hypergame theory over that of basic game theory models, there are
several reasons for this approach as discussed in 2.3. A typical game when designed for
game theory does not recognize the possibility that each player may be incorrect in their
assumptions about the game. When it comes to cyber defense, it is unreasonable to assume
that full knowledge about one’s attacker or their capabilities can possibly be known; even
the attacker is doubtful to have full knowledge of the system that is being attacked or the
defensive aptitude [42]. Hypergame theory provides a concrete way in which to insert this
difference in knowledge into the analysis. This is done by providing different game views
to each player. Strategies may be hidden from the other players through either discounting
them as options or because the ability of the player is unknown to the others. In particular
the Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) approach provides a built in risk assessor factor by
weighing a player’s fear of being outguessed. Also, through the use of hyperstrategies, the
HNF affords the possibility of increasing utility over that of a standard mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium (MSNE).
The previous discussion explains the reasoning behind the hypergame design decisions
that are put together for this research. A two-player strategic form game is used for its
simplicity in design and the simultaneous move system. Nonzero-sum utilities allow for
the possibility that each side can gain or lose based upon strategic decisions. Functional
utility values give environmental impact influence upon game conclusions. Hypergame
theory contributes the ability to analyze the game allowing for the fact that each side
may have differing perceptions on the game. The HNF is used as the model’s form so
that hyperstrategies can be analyzed for strategy selection. These design decisions are
integrated into the experimental game model.
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3.2

Model Design
Various approaches to the design of a game theoretical model are examined to provide

insight on the procedure that would best suit the needs of a study of hypergame application
to cyber security. Previous research, see 2.2, presents examples of model design that
show the value that game theory has in a decision making process. A model based upon
these ideas that seeks to recreate a real-world scenario provides the best possible source
for insight into how to deal with threats to a computer network. However, complexity
does not necessarily provide for better answers to questions about the usefulness of game
theory in this arena. The addition of strategies and more levels of hypergames to provide a
super model that correctly identifies all possibilities in an interaction between attacker and
defender is not only improbable, but would be difficult to manipulate [27]. Therefore, it
is necessary that the model be focused so it still provides tenable results, yet it needs to
have complexity enough that the value of those results is applicable. A balance between
usability and relevance to a cyber security situation is achieved through the combination of
previous research models.
3.2.1

Influential Models.

The model design proposed by Chen and Leneutre from [15], see section 2.2, fits
together well with the selection of game theory attributes described. They provide a basic
two-player, attacker and defender, game in strategic form with functional utility values
(Figure 3.2). The functions allow for changeable utility values that are based upon the
variables they contain, see Table 2.1. The most interesting concept envisioned is that the
costs of the various strategy selections, like Cm the cost of monitoring, are considered
as percentages of the value of the target, Wi . As the percentage to defend or attack the
target increases, the utility decreases. This is a logical design technique given that if the
cost percentage to attack two particular nodes is the same, the higher value node returns
a greater payoff. However, if cost percentages differ for two nodes it may be that a lower
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value node could be more cost effective to attack. This concept also creates the capability of
increasing the cost percentage above one hundred, indicating a node that is more costly to
attack than it is worth. Therefore, the model examined in this research effort expands upon
the Chen and Leneutre model by keeping this main concept intact by having percentage
costs associated with new strategic options. The model is further enhanced by changing it
into a hypergame.

Figure 3.2: Chen and Leneutre’s game model with functional utility values

There are various approaches to the design of hypergames such as those discussed
in [12] [24], but the work by Dr. Vane in [52], discussed in 2.3, offers a robust modeling
technique that also fits the selected game attributes. The main advantage the HNF has
over the other models is that it combines the subgames into one viewable grid instead
of having multiple game grids to view. Not only is this model visually appealing, it
also offers a straightforward system for strategic decision analysis. The creation of the
hyperstrategies, each examining the game from a different perspective, and the inclusion of
the g value, as an indication of a player’s fear of being outguessed, provides a definitive,
quantitative reasoning approach to strategy selection. The HNF also uses values for utility
results instead of a system of preferences like the other models. Although originally
described using static utility values and zero-sum outcomes, the evolution of the HNF to
using functional utility and nonzero-sum payoffs is not hindered because the row player’s
decision is already uncoupled from the view of the column player. In fact, Dr. Vane
describes that the changing of the model to nonzero-sum in this manner should be relatively
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straightforward [52]. The addition of the functional utility values does not change anything
significantly about the HNF, only that those values need to be calculated prior to the
hypergame analysis.
3.2.2

The Experimental Model Design.

In order to provide a quantifiable result on the adaptability of hypergame theory, a
game model is introduced. The model is a scenario in which there is an attacker and
defender vying for control over a network node. This is a specific example as to how the
concepts of hypergame theory could be applied to a cyber defense situation. It demonstrates
an overt, targeted attack against the network. Although the concepts introduced are an
example of hypergame modeling, one cannot assume that these apply in every situation.
Indeed, the purpose of the game model used in this study is only to give an example of how
a model may be constructed. The construction techniques used in the creation of the model
can be used to examine a wide variety of situations. The true benefit of hypergame analysis
is the ability to be adapted to the situation for which the model is built.
Both the Chen and Leneutre, and Dr. Vane’s models offer valuable tools for insight
into hypergame strategic reasoning. The combination of the two allow for a design that has
changeable nonzero-sum utility values and a quick process for the delineation of strategy
selection. These two differing, yet compatible, models lead to the creation of a design that
gains these benefits. The Chen and Leneutre game grid is expanded to increase strategic
selection for both the attacker and defender, while the HNF allows these new strategies to be
considered hidden or discounted by the other player. For the purposes of this investigation
in the area of network defense, the game grid is also switched from attacker as row, to
defender as row because the HNF analysis technique is designed for the row player’s
perspective of the game. Thus, the model design incorporates the functional utilities and
nonzero-sum from [15], keeping the strategic form and two-player setup present in both
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influential models, and upgrading the previous model to the HNF from [52]. The resulting
game is shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Game model designed for use in this study

Although the attacker and defender players have switched positions the upper left
corner of the game grid is recognizable as the Chen and Leneutre model (the top or left
most utility values belong to the row player, defender) with additional strategies available
to the players. These new strategies are each included in what is referred to as the full game.
The reason for this distinction is that for the hypergame modeling not all strategies are seen
or considered as options by the other player which creates subgames. A subgame of the
full game is where some of the strategies of the players are removed from consideration
because of misperception or through belief that a strategy would never be used. Each
player has new alternatives available beyond the original model that creates the hypergame
model. The attacker now has a new option, the zero-day exploit. The zero-day exploit is an
attack for which there is no defense because the vulnerability is a previously undiscovered
issue [4]. For the purpose of examining the effects provided by additional strategies, the
defender can use the provide ruse and shut down strategies. Providing a ruse, a honeynet or
honeypot, is a device for the defender to fool the attacker into thinking they are attacking a
real part of the network, but it is a façade designed to give the attacker the appearance they
are succeeding in the attack. The shut down option is removing access to the network node
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entirely, but of course this limits access to even authorized users and therefore may not be
a viable option.
The new strategies, as well as the new combinations of them with old strategies,
require new functions for utility determination. New variables are also necessary for the
calculation of the payoffs. They are summarized in Table 3.1, along with the holdovers from
the Chen and Leneutre model (which are repeated here from Table 2.1). For the attacker
the zero-day exploit has a cost, Cz , reflected as a percentage of the value of the target. The
defender’s shutdown option has a cost in amount of time the node is unavailable, Ct , and this
can rise the longer the system is down. The assumption for this study is that the attacker’s
intent is not to have the system shut down and that it is an option available to the defender.
Certainly in real-world situations the cost for shutting down could be raised to prohibitive
levels to reflect the lack of availability for this strategy. The provide-ruse strategy has a
similar cost, Cr , which can also be changed to reflect time and/or sophistication of the
ruse. However, the most important change here is the addition of the value of the attacker,
Va . This greatly affects the utility values of providing a ruse or shutting the system down
because the more dangerous the attacker, the more worthwhile it is to use these strategies.
This enables the defender to delineate between nuisance attackers and those that seek to do
real harm.

3.3

Custom Software Development
The process of hypergame analysis can be done by hand, but is a long tedious process

that is better suited to a software tool. In order to provide the output required for analysis
and testing the software needs to model the hypergame, provide calculation of utility from
functions, run multiple games with static or random strategy selection, and be able to update
variables and belief contexts between game iterations. Preexisting software is considered
an option, but must be able to provide the aforementioned items to be viable. Microsoft
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Table 3.1: Experimental Model Variables
Variable Symbol

Meaning

a

Detection Rate

b

False Alarm Rate

Ca

Cost of Attack

Cf

Cost of False Alarm

Cm

Cost of Monitoring

Cr

Cost of Providing Ruse

Ct

Cost of Time Down

Cz

Cost of Zero-Day Exploit

Va

Value of Attacker

Wi

Value of Target

Excel is proficient at modeling the hypergame and can calculate the utility from functions
easily. However, the difficulty of running multiple game iterations and updating variables
removed it from consideration. A math program, such as Matlab, can do the required
calculations and would even be able to run the multiple iterations with changes to variables.
These types of programs are not directly related to game theory so software specific to a
game theory application is more desirable in this instance. Therefore, software with direct
game theory application is considered.
3.3.1

Examination of Game Theory Software.

Perhaps the most intriguing tool available for game theory widely available is the
Gambit software. Gambit provides tools to do computations of finite, noncooperative
games and can use strategic form [34]. The most promising aspect of Gambit is the simple
user interface for the creation of games, Figure 3.4, allowing players and strategies to be
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added quickly. It also offers a suite of solution concepts that includes Nash Equilibrium
(NE) discovery as well as formats for storing and communicating games to external tools.
These options it provides make it a candidate for use in experiments related to hypergame
analysis. The source code of the software is written in C++, is available for use and
has been upgraded through the years since its original release in BASIC during the mid1980s [34]. The disadvantages for using Gambit begin with the lack of native hypergame
support as it is designed for use as a standard game theory tool. Functional utility values are
also not supported, although it does offer easy game creation with static utility values. The
software is viable, but without an existing way to infuse hypergame support (specifically
that of the HNF) and the requirement to update current code in numerable ways, it is
removed from consideration as the experimental tool.

Figure 3.4: Two-player 4x4 strategic game example with equilibriums from Gambit

Also there is software package, called HYPANT, that is specifically designed as
a hypergame analysis tool. Written by Lachlan Brumley [13] in 2003, it contains a
proprietary language known as Hypergame Markup Language (HML) that allows for game
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Figure 3.5: Example output of a two-player HYPANT game form (Cuba blockade)

player’s specific views of the game being played. In other words, it contains the most
critical aspect of hypergame analysis, full game versus subgame views. Several examples
of the usefulness of the tool are provided including the hypergame example from [12] the
Fall of France. These examples show that HYPANT does succeed in its goal as being
a hypergame analyzer. However, it does not use the type of utility values required by the
HNF and instead relies on stability and unilateral improvement values present in the Frasier
and Hipel hypergame model in Figure 3.5. The differences in the analysis technique used
by HYPANT and that in Dr. Vane’s HNF are great enough that upgrading HYPANT in this
regard would be more extensive that writing an HNF software tool from the ground up!
Another program using the HNF is in existence and is called Security Policy Assistant
(SPA). SPA is designed to facilitate the decision making process involved in the release or
withdrawal of classified documents from foreign disclosure [48]. It provides an input GUI
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Figure 3.6: Expected utility analysis window from SPA [48]

that allows the entry of information relating to the HNF. Once the data is entered it gives
output and graphs reminiscent of the outcomes present in [52]. A graph that is particularly
familiar is the graph of expected utilities, Figure 3.6, which is much like Figure 2.9 on page
28. This software is most like the avenue being pursued and although is not precisely what
is required does offer some of the features desired. Unfortunately, although the manual
for SPA was obtained, at the time of this research investigation the software is unavailable
and could not be examined or used. However, the fact that the concept has been used in
an application for determining disclosure policies for classified documents is evidence that
there is application for hypergame theory beyond previous military conflict analysis.
3.3.2

HNF Analysis Tool (HAT) Software Design.

The lack of currently available software that provides all of the aspects required for
the testing and analysis motivates the decision to develop a custom piece of software using
the Java programming language. This software incorporates the HNF by allowing the input
of a game design via Extensible Markup Language (XML) Figure 3.7. This form of input
is selected because unlike the proprietary HML used by HYPANT, it is a simple, flexible
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text format with a defined schema [40]. Software tools for retrieving data in XML format
already exist within Java. The game information present in the XML allows the software to
instantiate objects with the data for creation of a game environment. The main components
of the HNF are either included or derived from this information. Once the game is setup,
game iterations can be run with either random or static strategy selections, and variables
can be updated between games. The HAT customized software is designed to analyze the
XML provided game with the principles outlined in [52] using an object-oriented design
that encompasses its components.

Figure 3.7: Example of the XML game format used by the HAT software
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HAT is written in Java with the NetBeans Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
7.2.1 [3]. This IDE provides concurrent error checking while coding and compile time
results. The versioning software Git is used within NetBeans to ensure proper backups
are completed and so that changes made can be undone if necessary. Versioning is an
important part of current software engineering practices because without it, changes that
break performance of the program may be difficult to locate and reverse. Another reason to
have versioning, although not employed because of there is a single developer, is that when
changes are made by several designers, they can be merged together gracefully. Without
the ability to merge updates, changes to the same code at the same time cause conflicts.
NetBeans also has a refactoring solution built in. Refactoring is a disciplined technique for
restructuring an existing body of code, altering its internal structure without changing its
external behavior [21]. This does not provide the user with any outward changes, but can
be very important for the developers allowing the reuse of code, consolidation of structure,
safe removal of old code, and easy renaming of code artifacts to better describe their role
in the program. NetBeans IDE 7.2.1 is thus selected because of these code structure and
time saving devices, which facilitates the software’s object oriented design.
Individual objects encapsulate the components of the game mechanics used in the
HNF (Figure 3.8). The game consists of the players involved, the players cross reference
their opponent’s strategies, and the opponent strategies cross reference that player’s
available strategy choices which lead to the player’s utility values when these strategies
are selected together. The current design allows for a two-player game, but the objectoriented design allows for the extensibility to become an n-player game. The HAT loads a
game XML file, selectable by the user, and creates the objects based upon the data from it.
This is done by a process of parsing through the components of the file which correspond
to the object types present in the code. Each node of the XML file describes an object in the
code, providing all the information required that creates the full game structure as shown
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Figure 3.8: Core design of HAT software in Universal Modeling Language format

here output in the software window of Figure 3.9. The creation of these main components is
done through instantiation by means of a design pattern called the factory pattern. The main
reason to use a factory pattern is so that when changes need to be made for object creation
there is only one location where modifications need to be done [22]. This facilitates quick
and easy changes during design phase, but also allows for extendibility for later software
updates.
Each strategy cross referenced with opponent strategies utility has the ability to use
either direct values or functions. Static values are easily input directly into the object by
parsing the characters in the XML, but functions require a more dynamic approach. The
use of function utility values requires not only a scheme for input via the XML file, but
also for the evaluation of them through software. The variables present in the functions are
given their own section in the file that consists of identifying the symbol used and an initial
value for calculations. These variable identifiers are then incorporated into utility functions
by putting them into brackets for easy identification by the software, shown in the example
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Figure 3.9: Example of the main view of the HAT software with game loaded

function of Equation (3.1). The letter combinations in the brackets correspond to the
− {b} ∗ {C f } ∗ {Wi} − {Cm} ∗ {Wi}

(3.1)

variable names defined by the XML file. The identifiers are replaced by the initial values
for initial utility calculation, but the function form is retained for updating when variable
values change. This allows a critical component of the experiments to be available to the
game software. The functional utility code is a modified version of [18], where the initial
function string with variables is replaced by the variable values. After variable replacement
the function solver can provide concrete numbers for the utilities. Once utility values are
tabulated, the calculation of NEs commences.
The NEs for the hypergame and subgames are calculated using the Lemke-Howson
algorithm (3.1) because it works for non-zero sum bimatrix games. This is accomplished
with Java code that is an altered version of the one created by Junling Hu in an applet [26].
The advantage of updating this code for use by the HAT software is that changes made can
be validated as correct by entering the same information into the supplied applet. Also,
although not checked by this study, Hu claims that the program outperforms Gambit on
the speed of obtaining the NEs. There is no guarantee that the algorithm finds all NEs
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because at most it finds n + m, but at a minimum one is found as stated by Nash’s Existence
Theorem [31] [36]. The NE is then used by the software as the initial belief context in
the hypergame, C0 . Once determined, the rest of the game is built using additional belief
contexts which allows for the creation of the hyperstrategies.
Algorithm 3.1 Lemke-Howson [39]
Require: P1 to be the polytope of Player 1 utilities
Require: P2 to be the polytope of Player 2 utilities
Let x be the all-zero vector 0 of length m from P1
Let y be the all-zero vector 0 of length n from P1
Let k0 be any label of x
Let k ⇐ k0
loop
In P1 , remove the label k from x; let x0 be the new vertex and k0 the label added
x ⇐ x0
if k0 = k0 then
stop looping
end if
In P2 , remove the label k0 from y; let y0 be the new vertex and k00 the label added
y ⇐ y0
if k00 = k0 then
stop looping
end if
k ⇐ k00
end loop
print (normalize(x), normalize(y))
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The belief contexts are a combination of a probabilistic weight value, row’s belief that
column chooses that specific context to which it is assigned, and the associated Column
Mixed Strategy (CMS)s, the percentages of each strategy available to column. Each
supplied belief context is a subgame where any column strategy given a percentage use
of zero is removed. There are two ways in which subgames are determined: supplied belief
contexts within the XML game file or removing strategies labeled as hidden. The column
player’s view of the game still removes any hidden row player strategy, but the row player
sees the subgame differently as all his or her strategies are available. This concept holds
true even when the belief contexts are not provided in the XML file, in which case only
one belief context is built through the removal of column and rows hidden strategies. The
percentages for the CMSs for a built belief context is determined by the NE values for the
subgame, as seen by column. Hyperstrategies are created by examining the subgames that
exist in the hypergame framework.
The hyperstrategies generated by the software are the R x subgames, Modeling
Opponent (MO), Pick Subgame (PS), and Weighted Subgame (WS). The R x subgames
are not technically hyperstrategies, but they are included in the design for completeness.
Their values are the MSNE for the row player for the subgames as seen by column (any
hidden row strategies are not used in the calculation). The MO is made by examining each
strategy available to the row player and the expected utility it obtains versus the aggregate
belief context, CP . The best utility strategy is selected as the MO hyperstrategy, unless
it is the same as the R0 full game, then it is not included. A PS hyperstrategy is created
for each subgame (i.e. belief context) included in the hypergame. The MSNE is assigned
to row’s strategy selections using row’s view of the subgame (all row strategies available,
but without column’s unused strategies). Finally, the WS is made by aggregating the PS
and the R0 full game strategy selection percentages. The values are normalized through
multiplication by the associated belief context’s probabilistic value (the R0 is the full game
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NE from C0 ), then they are added together to determine the strategy percentage value for
the WS.
Each hyperstrategy, and the R x subgames, calculates the Expected Utility (EU), worst
case utility (G), Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU). The EU for each hyperstrategy is
given by cross multiplication of utility values with row’s strategy selection percentage
and aggregate column strategy selection in CP . Each strategy utility is added together
for the final EU value. Determination of the G value is based on worst case outcome.
The lowest utility available to row given a player’s strategy selection is multiplied by
that strategy’s percentage use, which are added together to give the G value. Once the
EU and G are finished, they enable the calculation of HEU. It is calculated by using
Equation (2.4) on page 27. The value applied as the fear-of-being-outguessed, g, is
instrumental in determining the outcome of the HEU for each hyperstrategy. The g value
can be predetermined or changed after a game is executed so that the next game can have
differing HEU values. This is important because the HEU is instrumental in hyperstrategy
choice.
After the game is fully built, it can be executed. The execution of a game consists
of selection of player strategies and determination of utility values obtained. A column
player’s strategy choice can be selected by means of a usage value or a usage file. Usage
values incorporated into the XML game file are percentages assigned to any column
strategy. The game executor then uses the usage percentages to choose a column strategy
stochastically. On the other hand, if a usage file is provided it is a series of strategy names
and the executor simply selects the next one in line. The row player’s strategy choice is
determined through selection of hyperstrategy. The hyperstrategy with the highest HEU
value is used and a strategy is selected by random number. The two strategies used then
determine the utility that each player receives in the game outcome. Game results are
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saved to a file in a comma separated values (CSV) format that can easily be imported into
supporting software.
The game has four additional update modes under which the games are executable:
variables, g value, belief context, and all of them combined. The variables are updated
by way of providing the game with an update technique for specific variables that can be
affected by strategy choices. Updates to the variables create a more realistic scenario as
costs for certain actions may change over time and as a result of previous choices. The
XML file variable node is able to contain updates that tell the software how to update
the variable between iterations. Inputting the player’s names, one or more players, and
strategy choice, up to one strategy per player, tells the software that the update to the
variable occurs when all of the strategy choices appear in the results of the current iteration.
Each set of player’s strategy choices is coupled with a value that changes the variable
and this is established as either an incremental change, up or down by this amount, or
direct change, the variable is set to the value. In this manner as the software progresses
through the iterations of the game, utility values update according to the settings it is
given. These changes not only affect utility values, but also possibly the equilibriums
and hyperstrategies. Game data is recalculated before the next iteration is run so that any
changes made are incorporated into the next iteration execution.
The g value update is accomplished differently and does not have as dramatic effect on
the whole game data as the variable updates because it can only change the HEU amounts.
This update is accomplished with a simple check of whether or not the defender was able
to obtain the utility that was expected during that game iteration. Since the g value is an
indication of fear of being outguessed, when utility value is as expected, it goes down;
similarly, when the utility value is not as expected, it goes up because the player has been
outmaneuvered. The increase and decrease values are settable within the XML file, so
they can be different for any game. The expected utility of the iteration is the max utility
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available in the row corresponding to the defender’s selected strategy. After the execution
of the game strategy selections, the obtained utility of the defender is compared to the
expected utility and the g value is updated accordingly. The lowering of a g corresponds
to correct choices and hyperstrategies are more likely to be selected for choosing strategies
in later games; conversely, the raising of g results from poor strategy selection causing the
player to more likely pick the full game NE for strategy selection.
The belief context updates are affected by the variable changes. The initial belief
contexts when based upon the utility values, in other words based upon a subgame view
within the full game, can change when those values do. In essence, if the initial game
changes then it can be assumed that a player’s belief about how the game is being played
would change along with it. So when utility values are changed the software reevaluates
the MSNE of the subgame that resulted in the initial belief context. The new mixed strategy
values for the opponent are input into the belief context. The updated context has direct
influence on the C£ value and therefore can affect the hyperstrategy values for the row
player. Once the changes are made to the belief contexts, the new values are applied
to the hyperstrategy calculations. When the next iteration of the game is played, these
changes may have an impact on row’s hyperstrategy HEUs which in turn affects the strategy
selection process for the current iteration of the game.
The entire process of the HAT software takes the form of an Observe-Orient-DecideAct (OODA) loop. The initial observation phase is the loading of the XML game file
into the software objects. The data entered is used to determine the utility values and
the equilibriums as the orientation phase. Included in this phase is also the calculation of
belief contexts and hyperstrategy mixed strategy percentages. Calculations made in the
orientation phase are used to determine the strategy selection by the row player during the
decide phase. The selected strategy is used for the game iteration during the act phase and
the utility values obtained are established. Game results are then used by the software
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Figure 3.10: The HAT processes as an OODA loop

to apply any updates that have been mandated by the outcome, which is the return to
the observation phase. It is at this point that the OODA loop has come full circle and
the process repeats until the final game iteration is complete. The coupling of the OODA
loop and hypergame analysis is a unique aspect of the HAT software that is not available
elsewhere.
3.4

Summary
The valuable portion of the game model design is the demonstration of how an

adaptable hypergame model is constructed. In the consideration between extensive and
strategic form games, strategic form is the choice because of its matrix style layout, ease of
control, and the applicability to the cyber conflict scenario. The number of players is kept
at two, attacker and defender, to limit the scope of the study and maintain manageability.
Game utility values are set as non-zero sum because in network defense there is rarely a
clear-cut winner and non-zero sum games allow for these shades of grey. Functional utility
values are incorporated into the design because they give the ability to apply changes over
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time and update the payoffs accordingly. Finally, all these decisions are incorporated into
a hypergame design that takes into account participant’s differing views of the game. The
model designation is a strategic form, two-person, non-zero sum, and functional utility
hypergame. The model is a scenario example designed to introduce the concepts required
for hypergame analysis and game adaptation.
The game model is a hybrid composition of two previous research efforts as described
in [15] and [52]. The Chen and Leneutre game model closely fits the design decisions
of the experimental model. Their model describes a simple attacker/defender scenario
that uses functional utility values that create a changeable outcome based upon variables.
The advantage is that it can more resemble a real-world scenario than static utility values.
Dr. Vane’s hypergame modeling technique is an expanded strategic form that shows the
differing views of the player’s without requiring multiple game grids. He also provides
mathematical tools for analysis of the design that can account for the row player’s risk in
the strategic decision making process. The combining of these two models creates a new
design that upgrades the Chen and Leneutre technique into the hypergame arena and Dr.
Vane’s HNF becomes more robust by using functional, non-zero sum utility values.
The requirements for the game model the directly affect the decision on what software
to use for the experimentation. The Gambit software is considered an excellent tool for
game modeling and NE calculation; however, it does not provide the necessary functional
utility values or a native way to model the HNF, two primary model selections. HYPANT
is an available hypergame analysis software that uses a proprietary game input language,
HML, but it also lacks functional utility values, instead relying on the stability and
unilateral improvement technique. The unavailable software package, SPA, does use the
HNF for strategy decision analysis as shown by the manual that is available. Although it
does appear that access to the software would be useful, the idea behind it is not network
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defense techniques. Thus, the decision to create a custom software tool is the choice that is
made.
The HAT software is designed with the goal of providing a tool that allows the analysis
of the experimental hypergame model design. A game is entered via XML file and the Java
code turns the data into objects within the tool that constitute the game. Software objects
are made to coincide with the aspects of a game model: hypergame, players, strategies,
and equilibriums. The game has the ability to create utility values from functions and
variable values. MSNE results are calculated within the software tool using the LemkeHowson algorithm. Any pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) found with this algorithm
appears as an MSNE, but with a percentage of one-hundred. Belief contexts are either
entered into the XML file, or can be created via subgames which are player views minus
the hidden strategies. The Row Mixed Strategy (RMS)s, MO. PS, and WS are calculated
using the techniques outlined in [52]. Each one provides its own EU, G, and HEU values
that are used to determine strategy choice. The fully built game can be executed with usage
values assigned to the column player’s strategies and the row player’s strategy percentages
determined with the RMSs. The players’ strategy choices determine the utilities each
obtains and thus the outcome of that game. Multiple iterations of a game are also able
to be executed with subsequent iterations being affected by previous results. This software
progression follows the OODA loop strategic level decision process.
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IV.

E

HAT Software Experiment Design Methodology

xperiments for the software are designed based upon the hypergame model. Initial
experiments are created to show that the HNF Analysis Tool (HAT) software

functions as needed by the model requirements. Games are designed that use the model
in a software simulation of conflict. Data collected from experiments is used to evaluate
the hypergame theory model’s utility as a tool for network defense.
4.1

Experiment Design
4.1.1

Pre-Experiment Tests.

Software use requires that expected output is produced with any given input. In order
to validate that the software is operational, simple sample games are created and input
into the game software. This is done concurrently with software development at certain
stages to ensure that the software continues to provide proper output. The sample games
are designed incrementally to test the most recent developments in the code which prevents
errors from becoming more difficult to locate. The initial games are taken from basic game
theory so that a solid base is constructed on which the more complex games can be built.
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) file that inputs a basic game is simple, straightforward, and human readable as can be seen here (Figure 4.1). When compared with
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game grid (Figure 2.1, page 11), easily recognizable features are:
player names, strategy names, and utility values. A test output is prepared and produced
when the software is run and a visual check that the display contains the correct information
is performed. These tests give confidence that the software is behaving in the manner for
which it is designed.
The initial tests show that the required information is input into the program from the
XML game file. They are a simple validation by text output that not only was the correct
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Figure 4.1: Basic game XML example (Prisoner’s Dilemma)

information received, but also that the data can be retrieved and output to the console. This
is an important step in the process because without this test there would be no confidence
that data could be manipulated correctly if the information does not begin with the right
input. The software loads the XML game file and generates the text output to the console.
The game is output in grid format as is expected with a strategic form game. The console
displays the game name, the player names with row player on the left and column player at
the top, each player’s strategies and the utility values cross referenced from the strategies.
The output is then visually validated that it outputs the model of the game that was intended.
Once the software is guaranteed to have the proper data input through XML
manipulation, the next test is designed to show that pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)s
can be produced. The code implements the simple method for finding the PSNE as shown
in 2.1 on page 12. This method involves marking the highest utility available to a player for
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each strategy available. After each player’s high utility values have been found, those that
meet in the same cell of the matrix are PSNE. The software uses the process of saving the
max utility value for a given player’s strategy and the opposing player’s strategy as the data
is input into the system; thus, quick retrieval of strategy and utility values for comparison
to the other player is possible. This is not an extremely useful technique because it cannot
locate any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) while the methods that can locate
MSNEs will also find the PSNEs (tagged as MSNE with the selected strategies at 100%
usage). However, it is another important step in making sure that the data is entered,
retrieved, and manipulated correctly within the software code. When the PSNE tests are
complete, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) method is tested.

Figure 4.2: Hu’s applet showing Prisoner’s Dilemma entered

The NE portion of the code uses the Lemke-Howson algorithm adapted from [26],
see 3.3.2.

Again, a text visual is used to validate the output, but because the NE

contains calculated values an external validating source must be used. The Lemke-Howson
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algorithm code is included in an applet that allows a game bimatrix to be input and produce
NE outputs (Figure 4.2). The applet’s output is not enough to ensure that the developed
software provides the correct values for NEs because the applet’s output is not known to
be correct. Instead, the Gambit software is used to check the applet. Once the applet
is determined to be operating correctly, necessary changes to make the code work within
the software are shown to be correct by comparing output of the HAT software and the
applet with identical game input. This is done by having the HAT output its derived NEs
to the console in text form for visual comparison with Gambit and the applet. When all
three sources of MSNE results coincide, this shows that the software is operating within
reasonable expectations for NE calculations.
After the NE is determined to be operating, the function utility portion of the software
is tested. The first test is a suite of selected functions that check the mathematic operation of
the function code. Each function example is designed to check various aspects of function
build: addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, order of precedence, and parentheses
overriding of precedence. Predetermined values via calculator are checked automatically
by test code with function code output. Next sample games using functions for the utility
values are tested. These tests require that utility functions replace the variable identifiers
with the values given to the software from theXML file. Like the NE tests, due to the
calculation of the utilities an outside source must be used for validation of output. An
Excel spreadsheet is designed to emulate the utility functions and variable inputs so it
can calculate expected values for comparison (fig:utilityFunctionSpreadsheet). The utility
results from the HAT, which are output to the console via text, are visually compared to
those given by the spreadsheet. The combined results of the function code test suite and
the sample games give the evidence required that ensures accuracy of the HAT function
calculator.
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Figure 4.3: Spreadsheet for HAT utility function check

Finally a test is performed to ensure the Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) is properly
structured and calculations of the Row Mixed Strategy (RMS)s and belief contexts are
done according to requirements. An example as outlined in [52] is used as an example for
a visual check of the form data. An XML game file is built according to the visual example.
Once the data is read in by the HAT software it is visually displayed in the main window.
Output is shown in a fashion very similar to that of the HNF with the belief contexts on
top (with their probabilistic values and Column Mixed Strategy (CMS)s), the RMSs to the
left, the main strategic form game on the right, and the Expected Utility (EU), worst case
utility (G), and Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU) values below. A visual check of the
numbers entered in the graph versus the values in the example determines the validity of
the software modeling. After this final check experiments involving games created in the
experimental model form are conducted.
4.1.2

Experimental Games.

The experimental games involve pitting a defender and an attacker against each other
with strategy selections using the hypergame model. Games are run between differing
types of attacker classes and defender classes. The attacker classifications reflect levels
of intensity and resourcefulness that can be encountered in a cyber defense scenario. The
defenders are built in terms of expected level of attacks. Games are run with the various
attackers and defenders interacting and show how effective the hypergame model is in the
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given situations. The various games are developed in an increasing sophistication manner
which presents how updates in values between iterations of a game affect the outcome.

Table 4.1: Attacker types and their usage percentages
Attacker Type

No Attack

Attack

Zero-Day Exploit

Nuisance

93.51%

6.49%

-

Low-Level

90.17%

9.83%

-

Mid-Level

86.61%

13.39%

0%

High-Level

0%

0%

100%

All-Out

0%

0%

100%

The attackers are decomposed into five different categories of threat: nuisance, lowlevel, mid-level, high-level, and all-out (Table 4.1). These attacker examples are designed
to cover a wide variety of attack styles for the purposes of this study. A nuisance attacker
presents an opponent with an unsophisticated level of attack, or one that seeks to do damage
that is not considered of much consequence to the defender. The low-level attacker is
attempting to do real harm to the system by stealing information or reducing access. The
mid-level attackers denote a more dangerous opponent, one that is consistently barraging
the network in an attempt to get critical information or deny service. The high-level attack
is a sophisticated attempt to destroy, steal, and deny. The all-out attacker is designed to
reflect the scenario where the attacker uses any means necessary to damage the network.
This opponent is likely to unleash a deadly barrage of attacks and use all the zero-day
exploits at the attacker’s disposal. All these amounts are based upon NE amounts given by
the attacker’s view of the game and do not include the hidden strategies for the defender,
provide ruse and shut down. Thus, although it appears incorrect that the high-level and allout attackers both expend 100% of their attacks on zero-day exploits, this is the result
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of initial game setup and does not reflect changes that may happen during game play.
Also these are examples of how a game may be designed, real-world models may differ
depending upon circumstances such as the inability to shut down the network. Each of
these attackers are pitted against defenders, which are similarly classified by the style of
attack they are expecting to occur.

Table 4.2: Defender types and their initial belief contexts
Type

Probabilistic Value

No Attack

Attack

Zero-Day Exploit

Nuisance C1

0.8

93.51%

6.49%

-

Nuisance C0

0.2

93.51%

6.49%

0%

Low-Level C1

0.8

90.17%

9.83%

-

Low-Level C0

0.2

90.17%

9.83%

0%

Mid-Level C1

0.8

86.61%

13.39%

0%

Mid-Level C0

0.2

0%%

100%

0%

High-Level C1

0.8

0%

0%

100%

High-Level C0

0.2

0%

100%

0%

All-Out C1

0.8

0%

0%

100%

All-Out C0

0.2

83.33%

0%

16.67%

The defenders are also named in the same fashion as the attackers: nuisance, lowlevel, mid-level, high-level, and all-out. The defender classes have belief contexts that
are equal to that of the reciprocal attacker type (see Table 4.2) with probabilistic values
set at 0.8, which means the defender suspects with an 80% surety that type of attack is
occurring. This setting still allows for a 20% possibility that the attacker is taking into
account the full game by applying this to the probabilistic value of the C0 belief context.
The defender is reasonably sure that the attack is going to be as expected, but reserves some
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expectation that the assumption is incorrect. However, since the hypergame is seen from
the defender player’s point of view, various updates to the variables are apparent with the
different classes Table 4.3. The changes in variables indicate differences in costs associated
with the game functions due to the different level of attacks expected.

Table 4.3: Defender type initial variable values
Variable

Nuisance

Low-Level

Mid-Level

High-Level

All-Out

Detection rate for attack (a)

0.90

0.88

0.85

0.83

0.80

False alarm rate (b)

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

Cost of attack (Ca )

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

Cost of false alarm (C f )

0.90

0.85

0.80

0.75

0.70

Cost of monitoring (Cm )

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

Cost of providing ruse (Cr )

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

Cost of time down (Ct )

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

Cost of zero-day exploit (Cz )

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.80

0.50

Value of Attacker (Cz )

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

Value of Target (Ct )

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Detection rate, a, is considered to decrease as the attacker sophistication increases,
reflecting a craftier foe. False alarm rate, b, increases because more scrutinization of
anomalous behavior in the system. The cost of attack, Ca , for the attacker and the cost
of monitoring, Cm , for the defender are both higher with each level due to the increased
complexity required. The cost of a false alarm, C f , is decreased as the defender is more
willing to accept these in the more dangerous situations. Cost of a zero-day exploit, Cz ,
drops for the high-level and war attacker because they are willing to use them and have
resources to obtain them. It is obvious why the value of the attacker, Va , increases with
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each level, the opponent is more dangerous. Finally, cost of providing ruse, Cr , and cost of
time down, Ct are both decrease with the attacker type that is suspected because a defender
is more willing to accept these options as threat level increases. The value of the target,
Wi , is kept at one because as shown in [15] the value is affected by other variables on a
percentage basis and is used to determine if a node is in the attacker’s set of worthwhile
targets. For the purposes of these experiments it is assumed that the node is being attacked.
Each type of defender is matched against each type of attacker. These game runs
should show that the defender that is designed against the attacker is effective, but that
not all defenders are effective against all attackers. When higher level attackers are pitted
against lower level defenders, the low level defenders are outmatched. However, even some
high level defenders against low level attackers fare worse than the defenders specifically
designed to combat them. This is due to incorrect strategy selection; in other words,
defending too heavily against a threat that does not exist. Each game will be run 10 times
for 100 iterations each in two fashions, stochastic and static attacker strategy selection. The
stochastic game allows a random number based upon the usage percentages provided the
attacker class to determine which strategy is used. The static game uses a file for providing
the strategies in a set order, but still maintaining the usage percentage. Both types still have
the defender strategy selection based upon the percentages in the hyperstrategy selected by
the Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU) by using a randomly generated number. The two
types are used to show if model behavior changes with constant input versus randomized.
These initial experiments are done without any updates to variables, g value, or belief
context amounts.
Incorporating variable updates into the game iterations allows the game utilities to
change reflecting the previous course of actions. These experiments concentrate on updates
to the cost of providing a ruse, cost of time down, cost of zero-day exploit, and value of
the opponent, see Table 4.4. The cost of providing a ruse and cost of time down increase
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Table 4.4: Variable update changes
Strategy

Strategy

Value

Variable

Selected

Selected

Changes

ID

Name

Defender

Attacker

Amount

Cr

Cost of Providing Ruse

Not Defend

Any

-0.5

Defend

Any

-0.5

Provide Ruse

Any

0.1

Shut Down

Any

0.1

Not Defend

Any

-0.02

Defend

Any

-0.02

Provide Ruse

Any

0.5

Shut Down

Any

1.0

Not Defend

Zero-Day Exploit

0.1

Defend

Zero-Day Exploit

0.4

Provide Ruse

Zero-Day Exploit

0.1

Not Defend

Not Attack
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when used as these affect legitimate network users’ access. They both lower slowly when
not used to indicate that user access has been restored for the time being, and it can be
beneficial to use them again in the future. The cost of the zero-day exploit will lower when
used successfully (i.e. the network was not shut down) as using it increases the likelihood
of its discovery and the eventual protection against it. The value of the opponent is the
most important aspect as it denotes to the defender the importance placed on protecting
the network against this specific opponent. Successful attacks, that are detected while the
system is up and running, raise the value of the opponent quickly. No attacks detected
slowly lower this value over time because the opponent has become less of a threat.
Variable updates affect attacker play as well as defender play; however, the attacker utility
values change according to how the attacker sees the game and not the defender’s view. The
experiments keep a separate view of the game for the attacker for the purpose of keeping
the attacker type with the correct attack percentages. These variable changes provide a
more apt simulation of a real-world scenario than restricting the game to the initial values.
The two remaining update types are used to affect strategy selection for the defender.
The belief context update changes the player’s belief context amounts according to the
defender’s subgame that the player believes the attacker is playing. When subgame utilities
are updated because of variable changes, the corresponding belief context updates to the
attacker’s new MSNE values. Since the initial belief context values are based on the initial
utility values, it is a reasonable conclusion that changes in the utilities should be reflected
by updating the belief contexts. The g value changes independently of the belief contexts
and affects the hyperstrategy selection for the defender. Values are entered in the XML
game file for the increasing and decreasing amounts when a defender feels outmaneuvered.
This check is made at each iteration for g adjustment value and it is applied before the
next iteration. Games are run with these updates applied independently of one another and
finally games are run with both types applied.
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4.2

Performance Metrics
Game experiments save information from all iterations of the game in a comma

separated values (CSV) file format where the header line indicates the data name separated
by commas, and lines beneath contain the values. The data saved for each game run:
the current utility values for that run for each player’s strategy cross referenced with each
opponent strategy, each row RMS (including their Expected Utility (EU), worst case utility
(G), and Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU) values), the belief contexts (probabilistic
values and column strategy percentages), each player’s selected strategy with the utility
it obtained, the row player’s max and min strategy as compared to the opponents along
with the utility it provides, and updatable values. The game data (utilities, RMSs, and
belief contexts) is collected each round so that updates from one round to the next may be
tracked. The game iteration data (strategies and utilities obtained, plus row player’s max
and min) is collected because it is the results of that round’s conflict. The update values
(variables, g) are saved to track any changes that may have occurred in these values per
round. The data collected gives insights into changes that are occurring while the game
iterations progress. All data is saved into a single file named after the game with Results
tacked onto the end of it, (i.e. Nuisance Attacker vs Nuisance Defender Results#.csv).
Multiple game run files are numbered in increasing order to differentiate between them.
In addition to the game round data each full run of game iterations collects final results
data in a separate CSV file. In a similar fashion to the game round file, a header line names
the data values that are located below it, but there is only a single data line entered for
each collection of game iterations. All game run final results are saved into a single file
with each run appearing on a successive line beneath the header. The data collected in
this file is: number of iterations, row player statistics, and each player’s strategy usage
percentage. The number of iterations is an indication of how many executions there are for
this line of data and the usage percentages keep track of how often each player used the
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specific strategy. The row player statistics include: total max utility obtainable, total utility
obtained, total min utility obtainable, utility ratio, and utility per game. The max and min
utilities are an upper and lower bound of how well or poorly the player does if the best or
worst strategies are always selected (when compared to the opponent strategy selection per
iteration). The total utility obtained is what is actually achieved by the strategy selection
choices made during the game iterations. The utility ratio is a measure of how the player
fared on total utility versus the upper and lower bounds set by the max and min obtainable
values. This ratio is an important factor when considering the success of the game run
because the higher the value the closer row came to utility maximization. The last row
statistic is the utility per game; it is the average utility per iteration and, when compared to
the HEUs, is another indication of successful strategy selections. Finally, the percentage
of use for each player’s strategy is saved as the number of times used divided by total
iterations of the game.
4.3

Evaluation Technique
The data that is collected is examined to provide evidence as to the effectiveness of

strategy selection during the game. As was discussed momentarily, a high utility ratio
is an indication of a strategy selection technique that is able to maximize potential utility
because it more often picks the strategy that provides the highest utility versus the opponent
strategy selection. A value of more than 50% is considered as successful because it has
more often avoided the pitfalls of selecting poor competing strategies. The closer utility
ratio is to 100% the better the defender’s strategy selection. The average utility, utility
per game iteration value, is also a measure of successful game play. The closer utility
per game comes to the highest value HEU the better the defender’s strategy selection.
Although it is difficult to imagine that it could be often greater than the highest HEU for
all hyperstrategies, certainly it is possible on any given run that a decent strategy selection
system could outmaneuver an opponent enough times to create this opportunity. However,
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any result that finishes above the initial R0 full game HEU shows improvement over the
initial NE expected outcome. Finally, total utility is taken into account although this
can vary greatly from experiment to experiment due to the stochastic nature of strategy
selection.
Since the initial game experiments are run without any update system in place
(variable, g, or belief context), those results are compared to the update experiment results.
The key is the improvement in the various data that is collected; when improvements
are made it is an indication of a more robust defense strategy. The updates to the items
involved are considered better utility ratios increase, utility per game iteration comes closer
to or above the HEU, and when total utility values outdo their comparative defense types.
The first update applied is the variable update, so the software simulation can reflect a
more realistic scenario. These are compared with the base game results. Improvements
to results are ranked in order of precedence with ratio being first priority, then utility per
iteration, and lastly total utility. The ratio is most likely to show a good strategy selection
because it maximizes available utility. In certain situations utility ratio can appear to
be superb when utility per iteration and total utility are low. When this occurs it is an
indication that the player has achieved the greatest utility, but that the player is limited
by the outcomes available. Utility per iteration is important because it is an indication
of how well the strategy selections are able to meet or exceed the HEU. Total utility is
less of a concern because this value is game dependent; it is affected by the utility values
present. Experiments are then performed with the variable updates intact with the g and
belief context updates included separately. The final update tests include all update types
together and is compared to the other update results determining if the changes, when made
all together, are able to give the best overall performance.

71

4.4

Summary
The new software requires initial pre-experiment tests to ensure that it is working

according to design and game theory principles. Basic game theory games are used to
ensure that the initial stages of development are behaving correctly. Simple visual tests
are performed via text to console showing that data from the XML game file is entered
and retrieved correctly. PSNE and MSNE tests confirm that the NEs are being calculated
correctly, with output validated by comparison to Hu’s Applet and the Gambit software. A
test suite performs a check of the function calculating code by comparing known results
to the ones provided by the method calls. Functional utility values are also checked after
being entered into the XML game file by visual check with game output utilities and Excel
spreadsheet calculations. A validity check of the HNF form provided by the software is
done to ensure calculations of required values for the experiments are correct.
Experiments are performed on an array of different attacker and defender types, with
each being pitted against each other. Both are classified as: nuisance, low-level, mid-level,
high-level, and all-out. These classifications reflect different levels of sophistication in
defense and attack modes. Standard games are executed without any updates between game
iterations. Update iterations adding changes in variables are compared to the initial game
runs. Belief context updates and g value updates are coupled with the variable updates
for comparison with the standard variable update execution. The games are run with g
value update alone, belief contexts update alone, and both updates together. These results
are compared to determine the update type which provides the best utility ratio, utility per
iteration, and total utility.
Total utility is a worthwhile metric to examine because it is a measure of game
success, but this can vary greatly between games and is best suited for comparing similar
attacker/defender combinations. Utility per iteration is valuable because the higher the
number the better total utility will be over successive iterations, and it can be compared
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in a percentage way to the HEU values of the hyperstrategies. The utility ratio is the
indicator that is considered the most influential because this value shows how close
the player gets to the maximum utility available for that game; this calculated value is
independent of game utility values and can be compared across games as a measure of
success. These quantifiable metrics are the determining factors for the outcome of the
experiments conducted.
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V.

T

HNF Analysis Tool (HAT) Software Experiment Results

he results of various experiment’s performances are presented.

Initially pre-

experiment tests are performed in order to assure that the software is functioning

as required for accuracy of the core experiments results. These core experiment results
are provided and an analysis of their results is discussed. Additionally a summary of the
experimental findings is given.
5.1

Pre-experiment Results
The hypergame analysis software developed for the core experiments is required to

be validated so that the resulting data can be considered legitimate. These validations
are performed incrementally as the software is written to assure that each step can build
upon the previous work. The tests conducted are validated through various means, but
each has a corresponding known good result to check against. Some of these results are
from literature sources, while others are verified by mathematical analysis using software
such as Microsoft Office Excel. These results show that the hypergame analysis tool has
been developed in accordance with the principles of game theory analysis, section 2.1, and
correctly emulates the HNF, section 2.3 on page 23.
Initial tests for game theory compliance involve the insurance that Extensible Markup
Language (XML) data is entered and retrieved by the software correctly. Three relatively
simple and common games are used to examine this: Prisoner’s Dilemma (11), Chicken
(12), and Matching Pennies. These games are used because of their two-player two-strategy
models which keeps this stage of testing to a minimum, yet providing all the information
required to ensure correct results. A “simple” text output is designed to show that the
games are input and the able to be output correctly. In fact, the initial output did reveal
that at first data was being retrieved from the software objects incorrectly because the row
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player’s utility values were being output second contrary to the common practice of putting
them before the column player’s utility. After code modification, all three games output
the results as they are designed in their respective XML game files. The sample output
(Figure 5.1) includes all three game outputs. The Prisoner’s Dilemma reflects both its
game grid, see Figure 2.1, and the its XML game file, see Figure 4.1. The passing of this
test allows continuation of development to the calculation of the Nash Equilibrium (NE).

Figure 5.1: Example HAT game grid test output (Prisoner’s Dilemma)

Selection of these games is also based upon the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)
that each provides, 12 Prisoner’s Dilemma has a single PSNE, Chicken has two PSNEs,
while the Matching pennies game has none at all. These games are used at this stage of
testing because they are all basic game theory examples with well known PSNEs [37].
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The variety of selections of PSNE provides confidence that the test indicates that the code
manipulation of data is correct. These equilibriums are found using the simple technique of
comparing the max utility value for each player’s strategies where row and column match
as maximum. The software does find the correct number of PSNEs as well as the proper
strategies for all three of the test games and this is validated by the output, see Figure 5.2.
This test along with the initial game grid output test shows that data is entered correctly
from the XML game file and precise data retrieval is achievable. Calculation of the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is now possible with the confidence that input data is
correctly entered and maintained.

Figure 5.2: HAT text output showing PSNEs of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and
Matching Pennies

The testing of the portion of the software that is able to calculate the MSNEs is
imperative because without this ability the hypergame software would not be able to
analyze any game data correctly. The test makes sure that at least one MSNE is found
because the Lemke-Howson algorithm (49) is designed to produce at a minimum one
MSNE; although, the algorithm can produce up to the number of the row player’s strategies
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plus the number of the column player’s strategies. Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and
Matching Pennies, and are also used in this test to show the software is operating within
expectations. In addition, a sample non-zero sum game is input to ensure that this type of
game also correctly calculates MSNEs.
Each game is first input into Gambit (section 3.3.1) and the MSNE is calculated using
Gambit’s recommended method. The sample non-zero sum game is shown in Figure 5.3.
Then the games are manually input into the applet (section 3.3.2) and its calculations are
compared with Gambit’s, see Figure 5.4. Gambit outputs in fractions, but the applet
outputs with decimal values; however the two agree on the amounts for each strategy. The
applet values (rounded) read from left to right equal the Gambit fractional amounts for each
player: row strategy 1 = 0.5572 = 185/332, row strategy 2 = 0.2761 = 275/996, row strategy
3 = 0.0 = 0, row strategy 4 = 0.1667 = 1/6, column strategy 1 = 0.2663 = 2256/8471,
column strategy 2 = 0.0543 = 460/8471, column strategy 3 = 0.6794 = 5755/8471. Both
software packages agree on the MSNEs for all games tested, so comparison is then made
with the HAT software output. The software is able to calculate the MSNEs for all games
tested and concurs with the results from both Gambit and the applet, see Figure 5.5. The
successful test shows that changes incorporated for the HAT software made to Hu’s applet
Lemke-Howson algorithm code do not alter the MSNEs obtained. This confidence check
is successful, so the software development testing continues with the functional utility
requirement.

Properly calculated functional utility values are another requirement of the model,
so its validation is a necessary step for completion of the software. Since the code for
function calculation is obtained from an outside source, it is an important step to validate
that it completes its task successfully. Thirty-nine different tests are performed as a test
suite for this purpose, including some provided by the code designer [18]. Each test
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Figure 5.3: Gambit MSNE results for non-zero sum sample game

Figure 5.4: Applet MSNE results for non-zero sum sample game

consists of a function designed to test a specific operational outcome (addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division, order of precedence, and parentheses overriding of precedence) as
well as operations with zero and leading negative signs. Each test contains the proper result
of the function tested; this result is compared to the answer given by the software for the
same function. All tests in the suite use the supplied code and complete successfully,
see Figure 5.6. However, this is only a portion of the testing done on the functional
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Figure 5.5: HAT MSNE results for non-zero sum sample game

utilities because they must be able to be entered with variable names and then translated
into functions.

Figure 5.6: Function code test suite completion

Two example games are used to test this functionality, Hawk-Dove from Figure 2.4,
13, and the Chen and Leneutre model from Figure 3.2, 38. Each game is given two different
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sets of initial values and entered into the software through their XML game files. A
visual comparison with Excel spreadsheets versions of the games with functional utilities
shows that they are able to be calculated successfully. The tests for Hawk-Dove check
V > C > 0, which emulates the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 5.7, and C > V > 0,
emulating the game of Chicken (Figure 5.8. The test done with Chen and Leneutre’s
model is a more complex utility function and works correctly (Figure 5.9). Once complete
and functional utilities are confirmed to operate according to specification, the HNF is
confirmed to be calculating required data correctly.

Figure 5.7: Hawk-Dove game V > C > 0 (HAT and Excel Output)

The HNF, as described by Dr. Vane in [52] and as discussed in 2.3 is the backbone
of the HAT software and it is necessary that is built according to specification.

It

must calculate the required hypergame values: belief contexts (probabilistic value and
Column Mixed Strategy (CMS)), Row Mixed Strategy (RMS), Expected Utility (EU),
worst case utility (G), and Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU). An XML game file
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Figure 5.8: Hawk-Dove game C > V > 0 (HAT and Excel Output)

Figure 5.9: Chen and Leneutre model game (HAT and Excel Output)
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created with Vane’s example 6.5 is loaded by the software for a visual check of its validity,
see Figure 5.10. The software produces an output that is visually similar to that of the HNF
and is compared to the example, see Figure 5.11. Although example 6.5 does not include
the G and HEU calculations, a simple check by hand confirms the output is accurate. All
other components that are calculated by the software are confirmed to be identical to the
example within rounding error. This test gives confidence that the software can properly
display and use the HNF form for use in running games. Experiments involving the
designed experimental model are now able to be performed because the software operation
is validated.

Figure 5.10: Example 6.5 from [52] for confirmation of HNF calculations

5.2

Experiments Results
The experiment games are run using the execute file option which is a script that

describes the various settings that can be used for the iterations. The execution file runs all
the defender types against all the attacker types and in each update mode: none, variable
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Figure 5.11: Example 6.5 output displayed after loading by HAT software

only, variable with belief context, variable with g value, and all modes on. Each paring
of attacker and defender is run for 10 separate executions with 100 iterations each. The
pairings are also run in stochastic (random) and static (text file) attacker strategy selection
forms. The HAT software saves each execution run in a file as well as putting overall
statistics into a final results file per pairing. This creates a total of 2500 game runs (10
executions * 25 attacker/defender pairings * 5 update modes * 2 strategy selection forms)
and a total of 250,000 iterations (2500 game runs * 100 iterations each). These executions
take a total of 6 minutes on an Intel i7 M640 quad core 2.80GHz processor with 8GB RAM
running Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit. The data collected provides insight into the actions
taken by the players during game play.
The defender’s view of the game determines the initial setup of utility values, belief
contexts, and hyperstrategies that make up the HNF game grid. Therefore, each defender,
no matter which attacker it is paired with, begins the execution at the same starting values.
This indicates that the defender is unaware of the attacker position and is expecting the
type of attacker that it is set up to defend against. The starting defender game grids
are: All-Out (Figure 5.12), High-Level (Figure 5.13), Mid-Level (Figure 5.14), LowLevel (Figure 5.15), Nuisance (Figure 5.16). As can be seen by these game setups, the
higher threat levels create more escalated attacks; while the higher the alert level of the
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defender, the more these attacks are expected. The most interesting observation is the
differences in strategy selection between these starting positions. The All-Out and HighLevel defenders choose the shut-down strategy, because the HEU for Modeling Opponent
(MO) is highest. Mid-Level defender also chooses its MO, but strategy best suited for this
defense is to defend. The Low-Level and Nuisance defenders prefer the full game view
and use its mixed strategy percentages for strategy selection. The game executions with no
updates keep these views of the game intact.

Figure 5.12: Starting game model for All-Out Defender vs. Attackers

Figure 5.13: Starting game model for High-Level Defender vs. Attackers
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Figure 5.14: Starting game model for Mid-Level Defender vs. Attackers

Figure 5.15: Starting game model for Low-Level Defender vs. Attackers

Figure 5.16: Starting game model for Nuisance Defender vs. Attackers
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5.2.1

No Update Experiments.

The game executions without any updates are a basic case and are mostly akin
to simple game theory models. In fact, four out of the five hypergames choose the
hyperstrategy that is the same as the full game MSNE, with the Mid-Level defender being
the lone difference. Thus these executions provide little in the way of surprise results.
The defender that is designed to take on the equivalent type of attacker provides the best
defense in terms of total utility obtained, utility per game, and utility ratio. Like shown
in Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 where the Nuisance defender outperforms all the other
defender types against the Nuisance attacker. Note the same totals achieved by Mid-Level,
High-Level, and All-Out defenders due to the non-update game runs not changing strategy
selection, where the remaining two defenders still use mixed strategy selection. These nonupdate games are not very realistic, however, because they do not take into account any
changes in values that occur over time. After all, an All-Out defender chooses to shut down
the entire system the whole time and that is certainly not the goal of anybody’s network
defense.

5.2.2

Variable Update Experiments.

The variable run games are when the games become more realistic because costs
change as strategies are used more often and the value of the attacker can change a
defender’s view of the situation. In the case of High-Level and All-Out defenders, values
drop in these initial variable update only tests, but that is expected because the attackers
also change their tactics because of the variable changes. Although, these defenders still
do best against their attacker equals. This drop in utility is especially true for the higher
threat opponents who are unable to attack with zero-day exploits in every game iteration,
see Figure 5.19 versus Figure 5.20, where total utility is no longer positive for any attacker
type. There is no doubt that the variable updates make a difference in the outcome of the
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Figure 5.17: Defender total utility obtained vs. stochastic Nuisance attacker

game iterations. The question remains whether or not updates to the other portions of the
HNF provide a better solution to the problem. This can be answered with the examination
of the remaining experimental data involving belief context and g value updates.

5.2.3

Belief Context and g Value Update Experiments.

The further updates seek to gain an advantage over the variable updates by providing
the hypergame with information gained during the game iterations. This begins to show the
true power of applied hypergame theory to adapt a player’s strategy choices to the situation
that is presented. The belief context update changes what the player believes is the mixed
strategy choices of the opponent in order to reflect the previous iteration opponent strategy.
The g value update is a confidence check that changes when dependent upon whether or
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Figure 5.18: Defender total utility obtained vs. static Nuisance attacker

not the opponent outmaneuvers the player in the previous iteration. The updates to the
mixed strategy values of the belief context and the HEU values because of g value changes
lead to a reassessment of the hyperstrategy selection process. Evidence of these differences
is shown in Figure 5.21, where the perfect result in utility per game from the no updates
(which is unreasonable) is unattainable, but improvements with belief context or belief
context and g value updates is achieved over variable updates alone.

5.3

Results Analysis
The results for the initial tests are able to confirm what is expected by the hypergame

setup, that when the attacker is as the defender expects all the statistics are at or near
maximum. Therefore the hypergame performs as intended by providing at worst the
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Figure 5.19: All-Out defender total utility obtained vs. stochastic attacker with no updates

expected NE when the actual game being played by both parties is realized. The results
also indicate that the All-Out and High-Level defenders are equal in their utility ratios for
all attackers because they have the same strategy choice. They also do poorly against the
remaining attackers, but this is due to the cost of having the system shut down against a
weaker opponent. The converse is also true, the lower level defenders, Mid-Level, Lowlevel, and Nuisance, are unable to defend against the upper attackers because the zero-day
exploit strategy is always used against them. They are able to obtain high total utility, utility
per game, and utility ratio against their counterpart attackers. The only reason these results
are not completely beneficial is because over the iterations it is basically playing the same
game over again. The lack of the updates does not provide a realistic scenario, for instance
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Figure 5.20: All-Out defender total utility obtained vs. stochastic attacker with variable
updates

a zero-day exploit can hardly be used indefinitely and keeping the system shut down forever
is not a winning strategy and certainly may not be a viable option in the first place.
The introduction of the variable updates begins to show how the hypergame strategy
selection techniques can adapt to the adversary they face. The All-Out defender, who does
poorly against the Nuisance attacker shows vast improvement when applying the variable
updates in both the stochastic and static experiments (Figure 5.22). In fact, across the board
defenders show improvements versus the attacker types they are not specifically designed
to combat. Even when it appears there is a breakdown in total utility obtained (Figure 5.23),
when the utility ratio is checked, the evidence indicates that this is not really the case. The
game changes and there is actually improvement according to the utility ratio (Figure 5.24).
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Figure 5.21: All-Out defender utility per game versus All-Out attacker for all update types

Therefore, total utility is a good indication of success, but utility ratio is better because it
shows how the adaptations are able to keep utilities high during game fluctuations.

The results indicate that applying updates does improve the defender total utility,
utility ratio, and utility per game. The functional utility values serve the purpose of being
the catalyst for these improvements. Updating belief contexts also allows for improvements
to those already gained with the variable updates. The g value updates are not as often
effective at increasing the statistics examined and sometimes can be detrimental to the
benefits gained by using the variable updates alone. The combination of both the belief
context and g value updates is typically in line with just applying the belief context updates
only; so there appears no statistical gain by adding the g value update. This indication
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Figure 5.22: All-Out defender utility ratio improvement by adding variable updates

does not mean that the g value is not worthwhile to update, just that automated updates
are unreliable. This value is a good candidate for human interaction at this level. The true
benefit of the modeling technique is the addition of the variable updates, but the addition
of the belief context updates adds to the adaptability of the defensive player. These results
indicate that cyber defense systems, built upon hypergame theory principles, could apply
these adaptive capabilities to increase their ability to thwart attacks.
5.4

Summary
The pre-experiment tests are performed to ensure that the developed customized

software operates as required by the designed game model. Tests that XML game files are
input correctly by the software are performed via text output. A check of PSNE discovery
of these games also ensures that the data is stored correctly and is also manipulated
accurately by the HAT. The portion of the software that produces the MSNEs is checked
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Figure 5.23: All-Out defender total utility obtained in static executions

via output; which is validated by both the Gambit game theory software and the original
coded applet. Further testing is done to make sure that the functional utility portion of the
code is able to produce the correct answers to given functions. This part of the software is
also checked by providing XML game files with string based functions for utility values,
showing that the software replaces variables in these functions with values provided. In
addition to these tests, the display of the software’s version of the HNF is compared with
one of Dr. Vane’s examples for validation that the components of the hypergame form are
being calculated correctly. The completion of these tests allows the confidence that the
experiments are performed within the expectations of the game model.
The experiments are executed with the HAT software via execution file that gives
the software direction on which game file to run, how many iterations to perform, and

93

Figure 5.24: All-Out defender utility ratio indicating improvement in strategy selection

what kind of updates are required. 2,500 game runs, totaling 250,000, iterations are
completed in this manner. The speed of the software and computer allow this to be done in
a reasonable six minutes. The games are setup to pit all different styles of defenders against
all the different styles of attackers. Each defender type views their starting position a little
different from the others and this creates five special formulations of the initial hypergame.
Games are run first without any updates; the results are similar to what is expected with
standard game theory. Variable updates are next and provide a more realistic view of what
occurs in an ongoing struggle for the network; strategies costs can change, attackers can be
considered more or less dangerous. Finally updates to the defender’s belief contexts and g
values are included in order to help the defender learn more how the opponent is playing
the game. This updates are applied to take advantage of the knowledge gained over the
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course of previous iterations of the game and influence the strategy selection choices made
by the software for the defender.
The analysis of the experiments confirms that the updates are effective at increasing
utility ratio, utility per iteration, and utility per game. The results are an indication of
the benefit of using functional utilities with variable updates and belief context revisions.
Although the g value updates is not usually as effective as the belief context revisions, it can
be considered a candidate for human decision making. Overall, the updates improve the
defender’s ability to select competitive strategies when faced with the variety of opponents.
The adaptive ability of the hypergame model suggests that network defense systems can
benefit from the strategy selection techniques used in these experiments. These findings
provide the foundation from which improved and adaptable network defense systems can
be built.
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VI.

A

Conclusions on Hypergame Theory Analysis

s stated most eloquently by Chris Inglis, National Security Agency deputy director,
“It’s almost impossible to achieve a static advantage in cyberspace whether that’s

a competitive advantage or a security advantage when things change every minute of every
hour of every day” [17]. Therefore, cyber defense systems must have ways to adapt to
the changing landscape of the conflict they face. Hypergame modeling and analysis is an
avenue to this goal. The HAT software shows that hypergame theory when applied is able
to achieve the adaptive nature required for today’s cyber defense needs.
6.1

Findings
The innovative results discovered in this research effort are an indication that there is

utility in the application of hypergame theory to the study of network defense techniques.
The examination of the meta-level game, a game beyond what an opponent sees, provides
an avenue in which one can get past the outcomes promised by the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
alone. The hypergame strategy selection also mitigates risk by providing the means to
include this fear of being outguessed into the equations that quantify the strategy selection
process. The adaptability of network defense systems could be improved by applying
some of the techniques learned through experimentation of hypergame models specifically
designed around the defended system.
The experiments performed give initial evidence that there is the possibility for
hypergame theory to provide a useful backbone to network defense systems. Inclusion
of hypergame theory on the agent level would allow some autonomous actions to be
performed; while inclusion at a higher level can give insight on an overall strategy to
mitigate attacks. However, these findings do not disenfranchise the human element; on
the contrary, they show that human administrators can use the evidence gleaned from
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hypergame analysis to make more informed decisions about the types of attack they are
facing. This gives hope that more powerful defense measures can be built that use the
power of computation for analysis and the human mind for intuitive decision making.
Even though these results are for a designed specific cyber defense model, the results
indicate that there is value in applying the principles of hypergame theory. A multitude of
models can be designed according to specific networks or defense scenarios. The software
is designed in a general fashion so that hypergames can be created that encompass a
wide variety of situations, and does not necessarily have to be network defense related.
Improvements over standard game theory results are possible using hypergame techniques.
The functional utility values are able to model real world situations much better than static
utility models. This is due to the fact that utility values can change and update according
to factors that are provided to the model. The coupling of hypergame theory with the
functional utility model creates a strategy selection technique that is more likely to adapt to
changes in attack patterns. Incorporating these principles into cyber defense systems can
make them more agile and allow less damage to be done to the networks they defend.
6.2

Impact and Action Recommendations
The goal of this research is to give reasons for the use of hypergame theory modeling

for future cyber warfare. Game theory has been used to study cyber warfare in many
different aspects and its continued study seems assured. However, little has been done
the cyber warfare arena in the use of hypergames. This research shows that a given
modeling technique can improve performance of defense strategy selection through the
use of hyperstrategy selection. The need for greater computer security is only growing
and one need only examine the Government Accountability Office reported issues chart,
see Figure 1.1, or even check the daily news to get a feel for the situation. Attacks against
computer systems are on the rise and show no signs of slowing down. The use of hypergame
theory provides insight into better strategy selection techniques; these techniques, when
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applied to defensive measures, can help to improve security. This study is the basis for
several initiatives involving hypergame theory.
Modeling techniques are not limited to being as compact as the one in this study.
Indeed the attack and defense strategies themselves are a lumped idea of the kinds that
can be used. The model only provides one possible idea of the types of attacks that can
be given their own strategy selection. Various selections of attacks are possible: probe
attacks, DDOS attacks, etc. Similarly defense techniques can also be expanded to include
direct defenses against the type of attacks that are encountered. The expansion of a game
grid to include many more strategies does increase complexity and the time necessary to
compute results. However, given that the current software runs 250,000 iterations on a 4x3
game grid while employing all update modules takes 6 minutes shows that increasing the
complexity can still be accomplished. These results are achieved on a laptop with an Intel
i7 M640 quad core 2.80GHz processor with 8GB RAM running Windows 7 Enterprise 64bit; therefore, even more powerful machines can be used to increase efficiency when large
complex games analysis is desired. There is also the option of parallelization between
computers to divide the calculations up and perform them at the same time to increase
performance for large game models. Increasing the complexity of the hypergame model
can move it toward a more true to life scenario which in turn increases its usefulness.
The HNF Analysis Tool (HAT) software can be used as a tool for modeling realworld scenarios and running possible outcomes. Hypergames, based upon actual data
of malicious network infiltrations, when entered into the software may provide data to
improve cyber defense systems. The manipulation of functional utility values within the
game and running iterations on these values can show how improvements can be made in
defensive capabilities by using hypergame theory. The alteration of game models presented
against the same attack characteristics could prove useful in the design of network security
agents that have been upgraded through the lessons learned through experimentation. The
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software could also be upgraded to implement an interactive mode for a user to play. In this
mode a person could test their strategy selections versus recommendations by the software.
This is useful for training of administrators on how a hypergame theory defense system
would provide them with strategy choices.
Network security agents infused with hypergame theory decision making processes
can provide valuable insight into what is taking place within their area of influence. Their
strategy decisions can be passed along to centralized decision makers which examine the
game from a higher perspective. Autonomous agents can have some strategy choices
available to make on their own, but the centralized system would be able to choose overall
strategies to combat the larger threat because it has a view of the larger hypergame.
It can control the number and location of agents, including the type of defense agents
since it knows where they are needed most.

The use of hypergame theory for this

decision making could provide greater return than even that available at a NE view of the
game [45]. Hypergame theory can provide the maximization of defensive measures with
the minimization of network interference. This is done by taking a standard game theory
model and ensuring that the hypergame model at worst gets the utility available at the NE.
Couple this with administrative support that can update the risk factors (i.e. the g value)
when damage seems to be increasing and therein lies the makings of a next generation
cyber defense system.
6.3

Software Expansion and Future Research
The software as written is complete to the point of giving this research the tool it

required for analysis of the feasibility of hypergame theory applied to network defense.
However, that is not to say that the software cannot be extended to incorporate different
features. One of the core design principles used is open for extension and closed for
modification [22]. This means that extendibility is built in allowing for new features to
be added, but not at the price of having to modify existing code. The concept also includes
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modularity so that, if required, old methods can be removed and new ones plugged in their
place. In other words, even if the guts of how something is performed changes, the ins
and outs can be kept the same. These concepts allow for the possibility of the following
expansion ideas to be implemented without recoding the main structure of the software.
An interactive mode is suggested as a teaching tool. The software could allow a
student to control the strategy selection with or without a suggestion provided. In this
manner one could try to anticipate and discover the type of opponent that is playing against
the user. A changeable g value slider would be an excellent way for the software to suggest
which hyperstrategy that should be considered for the player’s next move. This would be
similar to that employed in the Security Policy Assistant (SPA) software [48], allowing the
player to see how confidence in what is believed to be true affects the Hypergame Expected
Utility (HEU). The interactive mode would also be a useful tool for model design because
when moving slowly through game iterations one could see how changes are implemented
in the game grid. This allows one to see where tweaks or different values may make the
model more like the scenario that is attempting to be realized.
The HAT software currently supports operation for two-player games, but it does
have the ability to be expanded to n-player. Cooperative games, in which agents of both
defensive and offensive sides are considered as different players, can be considered as
possible scenarios. Attackers can also be considered as different players even when keeping
the defensive side as a single player. Rarely are all attacks a network is experiencing coming
from the same source. Indeed, attacks may not even have the same goal and be from
entities that are not cooperating or even have knowledge that the others are involved. This
last scenario is an excellent candidate for hypergame analysis because it contains the core
concept of misperception and incomplete information. Some changes would be required
to incorporate these concepts into the HAT. The HNF form needs updated to show more
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than two players, but this can be accomplished like Gambit (Figure 3.1, 35). The concept
of multi-player games was considered as an expandability option during software design.
The software currently supports multiple player inputs in the XML, but most objects
used within are generic to handle expansion. The naming conventions for opposing
player strategies listed in the player objects would require updating. The update here
would require each opposing player’s strategy to be listed in the name so that cross
referencing could be completed when a player’s utility values are obtained. Also NEs are
being determined with the Lemke-Howson algorithm which is only suitable for two-player
bimatrix games [31]. This is due to the fact that a greater number of players removes the
problem from linear complementarity because it is no longer bimatrix. Some suggested
methods for n-player game NE calculation are simplicial subdivision, Govindan-Wilson,
and non-globally convergent methods [2]. A method that follows a new process can be
inserted in place of the Lemke-Howson algorithm. The modular design method used in the
software development allows these changes to be implemented with limited impact on the
other portions of the code.
One of the main functions of the HNF is that it examines the game as the row player
views it, but not the column player. Column most certainly has a different view of the game
which the HNF does take into account, but row may not have all the information about
strategies available to column. This does appear counterintuitive because as a network
defender the job is to minimize the loss occurring to the system. However, it may be
advantageous at some times to see how minimizing column utility could affect strategy
selection.
6.4

Summary
Achieving an adaptive strategy to combat cyber threats is what hypergame modeling

and analysis is able to provide. The customized software HAT shows that this outcome
is possible.

It presents a foundation upon which future cyber defense initiatives
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should be based. The results of this innovative study provide the initial evidence that
hypergame analysis techniques can improve automated defenses as well as strategy
selection recommendation to the humans that watch over networks. Computer network
defense systems are required to be more agile and adapt the ever changing landscape which
they are encountering; establishing hypergame theory based defense systems is one way to
accomplish this goal. Future hypergame models should be expanded to more resemble
real-world situations as closely as possible. These models can be designed and run with
the HAT software for development and simulation. This software is the beginning of what
should be a revolution in network defense techniques.
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[29] Jormakka, Jorma and Mölsä. “Modelling Information Warfare as a Game”. Journal
of Information Warfare, 4(2):12–25, 2005.
[30] Khan, Mohammad Emtiyaz. “Game Theory Models for Pursuit Evasion Games”,
2007. URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.89.7157. Department of Computer Science University of British Columbia.
[31] Lemke, C. E. and J. T. Howson. “Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games”. SIAM
Journal on Applied Mathematics, 12(2):413–423, 1964.
[32] Lyman, Robert K., Lieutenant Colonel USAF. “Decisive Use of IO”. IOSphere, 2007.
[33] Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein, Quanyan Zhu, Tansu Aplcan, Tamer Başar, and
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